Egeneonu v Egeneonu

A contempt arising from breach of a court order is ordinarily civil, even where the order concerns wardship. Criminal contempt in the wardship context is confined to conduct which, without the court’s consent, undertakes or facilitates an important or major step in the life of a ward, with knowledge of the wardship. Breach of an order does not become criminal merely because the proceedings concern a ward. A contempt involving interference with the administration of justice also requires proof of the relevant specific intent. That issue must be properly pleaded and determined in the original committal proceedings. The court cannot retrospectively convert findings of breach into findings of criminal contempt.

The mother applied for declarations concerning the father’s contempts of court. The children had been made wards of court after being taken to Nigeria, and the father had breached orders requiring, among other things, that he refrain from leaving the jurisdiction and return the children.

Newton J found the father guilty of the alleged contempts in [2015] EWHC 954 (Fam) and sentenced him in [2015] EWHC 4187 (Fam). The committal proceedings had been pleaded and decided solely as breaches of court orders. The mother later sought a declaration that specified contempts were criminal offences, relying on wardship and alleged interference with the administration of justice. The central issue was whether the existing findings could properly be characterised retrospectively as criminal.

1. Jurisdiction. The court had, and should exercise, an inherent declaratory jurisdiction to determine whether the specified contempts were criminal or civil. The declaratory jurisdiction was distinct from the inherent jurisdiction relating to children.
2. Wardship. The criminal contempt jurisdiction arising from wardship is defined by the incidents of wardship, not merely by the child’s status as a ward. Criminal contempt requires that a person, without the court’s consent, undertake or facilitate an important or major step in the ward’s life which cannot lawfully be taken without prior consent, and that the person know the child is a ward. Removing a ward from the jurisdiction or marrying a ward without consent are examples. Other breaches in wardship proceedings remain civil contempts merely because the child is a ward.
3. The children’s removal to Nigeria occurred before they became wards. Later failures to return them breached orders, but the material did not establish criminal contempt by reason of wardship.
4. Interference with the administration of justice. Threatening or pressuring a litigant to abandon proceedings can constitute criminal contempt, but only where the defendant intends to interfere with, impede or prejudice the administration of justice. That specific intent is a necessary ingredient and must be pleaded and proved.
5. The original committal application alleged only breaches of orders and undertakings. It did not allege wardship as an ingredient, interference with the administration of justice, or the necessary intent. Newton J made no specific findings on those matters. His later sentencing observation that the father had deliberately subverted the orders could not supply the missing findings retrospectively. Reliance on Article 6 and basic procedural fairness reinforced that conclusion.
6. Even in relation to persistent and flagrant breaches which frustrated the court’s process, the court could not itself make the necessary criminal findings on the existing record. The question whether criminal contempt constituted a criminal offence, and whether it was an extradition offence, therefore did not arise.
7. The application for declaratory relief was dismissed.

not stated in the judgment.