Martin v Williams

On an appeal under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975, the appellate court reviews the exercise of discretion for error of principle, failure to consider relevant matters, or a plainly wrong conclusion. The statutory inquiry has three stages: standing, whether reasonable financial provision was made, and what provision should be ordered. For a maintenance claimant, provision must be reasonable in all the circumstances, but it is not confined to subsistence and does not extend to everything reasonably desirable. A significant asset may be left out of account in an appropriate case, but only on sufficiently cogent evidence. A court must assess the needs and resources of all relevant beneficiaries, apply the statutory test consistently, and avoid treating a settlement offer as decisive evidence of need. The proper remedy may be a life interest where an outright transfer would exceed what is necessary.

The respondent claimed provision from the estate of Norman Martin under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975. The County Court found that she qualified to apply, that the will failed to make reasonable financial provision for her maintenance, and that the deceased’s 50% interest in the parties’ home should be transferred to her.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the assessment of the respondent’s needs, the treatment of her interest in another property, the assessment of the appellant’s own needs, and the extent of the relief. Permission was limited in relation to standing. The central issues were whether the trial judge had erred in principle and, if so, what provision should be made.

1. Standard of review. The appeal was governed by the approach applicable to an exercise of discretion. The order could be set aside for an error of law, failure to take account of relevant matters, consideration of irrelevant matters, or a plainly wrong conclusion. The appellate court was not entitled to substitute its view merely because it would have reached a different result.
2. Statutory structure. The Act required separate consideration of standing, the binary value judgment whether reasonable financial provision had been made, and the discretionary question of what provision should be ordered. Although the relevant factors could overlap, the second and third questions were distinct.
3. Assets and evidence. The respondent’s 50% interest in 60 Slade Road was an immediate and significant financial resource. The evidence did not establish that it was legally unavailable or that realising it would necessarily require the eviction of her sister. The trial judge had therefore acted perversely in leaving the asset wholly out of account. The appellant’s unchallenged evidence of her own needs should not have been discounted. The settlement offer concerning a life interest was an unsafe basis for inferring that she lacked financial need.
4. Reasonable provision. The trial judge had applied inconsistent and incorrect approaches to the parties’ needs and had failed properly to apply the statutory maintenance test, testamentary freedom, and the resources and needs of the beneficiary. The order transferring the deceased’s whole interest in the home was consequently excessive.
5. Reassessment and order. The finding that the will failed to make reasonable provision for the respondent’s maintenance was upheld on the established facts. The appellate court reassessed the relief. The respondent was to receive a life interest in the deceased’s 50% interest in 20 Coburg Road, with the reversion and other rights vested in the appellant. The court would hear submissions on the form of order and costs.

• High Court (Chancery Division) On appeal from the County Court at Central London, the court upheld the finding that the will failed to make reasonable financial provision but set aside the transfer of the deceased’s entire interest in 20 Coburg Road and substituted a life interest.