Lisle-Mainwaring v Associated Newspapers Ltd & Anor

Compensation following an accepted offer of amends is assessed on the same principles as libel damages. The court first assesses the damages appropriate after a trial without material aggravation or mitigation, then adjusts the sum for the offer, apology, correction and related steps.

Burstein particulars must provide directly relevant background to the claimant’s reputation or sensitivity in the part of life attacked by the libel. Damages may reflect compensation, distress and vindication, subject to proportionality under Article 10. A claimant may recover reasonable costs of mitigating foreseeable internet republications, but the loss, republications, serious-harm basis and costs must be properly pleaded and particularised before an offer of amends is accepted.

The claimant sued Associated Newspapers Ltd and Kathryn Knight for libel arising from two articles published online and in the Daily Mail. The articles alleged that the claimant had betrayed her late husband’s family and reneged on financial commitments, and contained a further private allegation.

The defendants made a qualified offer of amends under the Defamation Act 1996, which the claimant accepted. The court had to assess statutory compensation, determine the effect of Burstein particulars and a settlement with the claimant’s stepson and his wife, decide the appropriate offer-of-amends discount, determine costs arising from an application under section 3(3), and decide whether special damages were recoverable for removing internet republications.

1. General damages. Compensation under section 3(5) of the Defamation Act 1996 was assessed on the same principles as libel damages. The relevant considerations included the gravity of the allegations, extent of publication, injury to reputation, distress and the reduced importance of vindication where falsity had been admitted. The award had to be proportionate to the legitimate purposes identified under Article 10 of the Convention.
2. Burstein particulars. Background material is admissible only where it is directly relevant to the claimant’s reputation or sensitivity in the sector of life attacked by the libel. The claimant’s conduct in the Cobbe proceedings and the painting of her property did not concern the same personal or family sphere and did not justify reducing the award.
3. Mitigation and assessment. The claimant’s £25,000 settlement with Robert and Sally Lisle substantially concerned publications to the same effect. It therefore mitigated the damages under section 12 of the Defamation Act 1952, although its effect on reputation was limited because the settlement had received little publicity. A single award was appropriate because the two articles were published within days and substantially overlapped.
4. Offer of amends. The court applied the usual two-stage approach. The starting figure was £90,000. The defendants’ delay before making the offer justified a substantial discount, but later negotiation difficulties were not principally attributable to them. A 40 per cent discount produced general damages of £54,000.
5. Special damages. Reasonable costs of removing foreseeable defamatory internet republications can in principle be recovered. However, the claimant’s pleading identified existing republications and costs already incurred, not a continuing loss requiring future expenditure. The rolling solicitors’ invoices did not identify the republications, serious-harm basis, responsibility, reasonableness or discrete cost of dealing with each item. The special-damage claim was therefore dismissed, subject to any application for a separate assessment limited to the properly pleaded claim.
6. The defendants were awarded the costs of the claimant’s rushed and misconceived section 3(3) application, subject to detailed assessment unless summary assessment was requested.

First-instance assessment of compensation and related costs following acceptance of a qualified offer of amends. No appellate history was stated.