The Secretary of State for the Home Department v EC & Anor

On a review of a TPIM notice, the court applies judicial review principles to the Secretary of State’s assessment of involvement in terrorism-related activity. The decision may be quashed where relevant matters were ignored, irrelevant matters considered, a determinative factual error made, or the conclusion was irrational.

The necessity of a TPIM notice and its individual measures requires a proportionality assessment. The court must scrutinise each measure intensely, while allowing appropriate weight to the Secretary of State’s assessment of operational risks and resources. The more intrusive the measure, the more compelling the justification required.

The respondents were prosecuted for an alleged knife attack inspired by the murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby. One was acquitted and the jury failed to agree on a verdict against the other; the prosecution then abandoned any further trial.

Before their release, the Secretary of State served TPIM notices under the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011. The respondents challenged Conditions A, C and D: involvement in terrorism-related activity, the necessity of the notice, and the necessity of the specified measures. The central issues were whether the Secretary of State’s conclusions were rational and whether the notice and measures were proportionate.

1. The TPIM notices were upheld. The court was satisfied that Conditions A, B and C were met in EC’s case and that Conditions A to C were met in EG’s case. The measures remained necessary to protect the public. No immediate amendments were required, subject to limited practical variation in EC’s computer and association measures.
2. Under section 9(2) of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011, the review proceeded by applying judicial review principles. The court therefore did not conduct a merits rehearing. It considered whether the Secretary of State had relied on proper material and whether the conclusions were rational applying the Wednesbury test. A particularly determinative factual error could also justify intervention.
3. Conditions C and D required proportionality. Following the approach in SSHD v MB [2007] QB 415, the court considered the nature of the suspected terrorism-related activity, available resources and surveillance arrangements, and the Secretary of State’s institutional position. That deference did not prevent intense scrutiny of each obligation. Alternative means had to be explored where measures were especially onerous or intrusive, and the more serious the impact, the more compelling the need.
4. The evidence, including communications, extremist statements, the proposed journey to Syria, and the acquisition of a knife and sharpener, rationally supported the Secretary of State’s conclusions. The respondents’ explanations were rejected. EC was found to have intended to engage in terrorism-related activity in Syria and to have been involved in the proposed attack. EG was found to have supported ISIS and violent extremism and to have knowingly assisted with obtaining the weapon, although the court was not satisfied that he would have joined the attack.
5. The court recognised positive signs in both respondents’ subsequent conduct but considered it too early to conclude that the risk had disappeared. The TPIM notices were to continue, with reconsideration in June.