A v Cornwall Council

A public authority may not restrict a parent’s contact with a child because the parent holds views about abortion or same-sex marriage. It may, however, consider the literal content of the parent’s publications, the strength of the parent’s views, and whether the parent can tolerate dissent or support the child’s developing autonomy. Proper questioning about those matters does not, without more, infringe freedom of thought, religion or expression. Reports prepared for a Family Court should be produced through a fair process, including a meaningful opportunity for the parent to explain material that may have been misunderstood. The ultimate decision on contact remains for the Family Court.

A claimed that Cornwall Council had infringed his rights under the European Convention on Human Rights by relying on his internet blogs and views about abortion and same-sex marriage when assessing contact with his son and preparing reports for Family Court proceedings. He also alleged unfairness, discrimination and interference with family life, religious belief and freedom of expression.

The Council maintained that its concerns related to safeguarding, the literal content of the blogs, A’s conduct and mental health, and the welfare of the child. The central issues were whether the Council’s conduct was incompatible with articles 6, 8, 9, 10, 12 or 14 of the Convention and, if so, what remedy should follow.

1. Claim dismissed. The Council had not infringed A’s Convention rights or otherwise breached a relevant duty.
2. It was common ground that it would be unlawful to prevent contact merely because a parent held views or beliefs that abortion was wrong or that same-sex marriage should not be legal. Society must tolerate diverse parental standards and views. Article 2 of the First Protocol supported that principle.
3. The Council was nevertheless entitled to consider A’s blogs and views in its safeguarding assessments. Read literally, the statement that an eight-month-old child was hardly a person raised a legitimate concern. The Council could also consider the strength of A’s views, his reported intolerance of disagreement, and whether he would allow the child to develop independent views. The relevant concern was the effect of those matters on parenting, not disagreement with A’s beliefs.
4. A retained freedom of thought and belief and could continue to publish his blogs. The questioning about their meaning and about his approach to possible disagreement by the child was permissible. It did not amount to an impermissible interference with articles 9 or 10.
5. The Council did not cause the initial cessation of contact. The police advised against contact during their investigation, M opposed contact, and the Family Court later decided the applications. The Council’s reports were relevant to those proceedings, but the Family Court remained responsible for the decision on contact. A’s complaints about the reports were matters for that court and any available appeal.
6. Fairness was important because reports likely to influence a court should be more reliable and command the respect of the parties and the wider public. The Council’s initial expression of opposition to contact before meeting A was concerning, and the meeting could have been approached more carefully. Nevertheless, A was subsequently heard, and the process as a whole was fair.
7. There was no established discrimination, breach of article 12, or infringement arising from the school-related matters. A’s claims were dismissed.