Ashcroft & Anor v Webster

An extended civil restraint order may be extended where the court considers continuation appropriate. The court must assess the evidence of future vexatious conduct and must not assume that an existing order should continue. Earlier conduct remains relevant as context, particularly when assessing the significance of conduct during the order’s operation, but it must not be counted twice. The order is a filter for claims and applications, not a denial of access to the courts. Its duration and scope must remain proportionate to the legitimate aims of protecting other litigants, court resources and the administration of justice.

The claimants sought a further two-year extension of an extended civil restraint order made against the defendant on 23 March 2015. The order followed repeated litigation concerning family property, including claims dismissed as totally without merit, unsuccessful appeals, further claims and applications revisiting issues already determined.

The defendant opposed continuation, contending that the restraint was unnecessary and that his conduct did not justify a further restriction. The central issue was whether, in the circumstances existing at the expiry of the order, it was appropriate to extend it under Practice Direction 3C to Part 3 of the Civil Procedure Rules.

1. Applicable test. The court held that an extension of an extended civil restraint order is governed by whether it is appropriate to extend the order. The court must not simply reconsider whether the requirements for imposing the original order would now be satisfied, or give double credit for the conduct that justified the original order.
2. Evidence and context. There is no presumption that an expiring order continues. The applicant must provide evidence supporting a reasonable apprehension of future persistent vexatiousness. The earlier conduct remains relevant background, while conduct during the order’s operation may demonstrate the defendant’s continuing intentions. That is contextual assessment, not double-counting.
3. Access to justice. As explained in Nowak v The Nursing and Midwifery Council [2013] EWHC 1932 (QB), a civil restraint order does not prohibit access to the courts. It requires claims or applications within its scope to pass through an initial judicial filter. The restraint must be necessary and proportionate to protecting other parties and public court resources.
4. Application. The defendant continued to challenge the earlier judgment, had pursued further proceedings and applications raising overlapping issues, and indicated that he would seek further court intervention if permitted. His conduct, viewed with the earlier litigation, created a clear and serious risk to the claimants, third parties and the administration of justice. The court also considered the defendant’s inability to meet costs orders and the need for effective protection.
5. Order. The extended civil restraint order was continued for the full permitted period, expiring on 22 March 2019. Its scope was corrected so that it applied only to the High Court and the County Court, rather than to any courts.

The judgment records that the defendant’s earlier proprietary estoppel claim was dismissed by HHJ Purle QC in [2013] EWHC 1316 (Ch). Permission to appeal was refused by Lord Justice Lewison and, on renewal, by Lord Justice Floyd. Subsequent claims and applications were struck out or refused, and the present court extended the existing restraint order.