Baksh, R (on the application of) v London Borough of Brent

Where a claimant fails to comply with directions in urgent judicial review proceedings, the court should assess the default by applying the three-stage Denton approach: seriousness and significance, explanation, and all the circumstances. Prejudice to a vulnerable claimant remains relevant, but it does not excuse unexplained and substantial procedural failure. A later decision may sometimes justify continuing proceedings on the basis of convenience, but the court must consider whether that course would produce the just disposal of the particular claim. Where the challenged decision has been superseded and the claim is not ready for hearing, the court may refuse amendment and adjournment and dismiss the claim, leaving any fresh challenge to proceed through the ordinary permission process.

The claimant sought judicial review of a care assessment made by the defendant under the Care Act 2014. Permission had been granted on two grounds and an expedited hearing was listed. The claimant later received an updated assessment and sought to replace the statement of facts and grounds and adjourn the hearing. The application was made late, the required procedural steps had not been completed, and the updated assessment had not been filed with the court.

The defendant opposed further delay. The central issues were whether the claimant should be permitted to substitute grounds, whether the hearing should be adjourned, and whether the existing claim should proceed where the challenged assessment had been superseded.

1. Applications refused and claim dismissed. The court refused permission for the replacement statement of facts and grounds and refused an adjournment. As the claimant did not seek permission to appeal or make any further application, the judicial review claim was dismissed because it was not being further proceeded with.
2. Procedural default. Applying the three-stage test in Denton, the failure to comply with the January directions was serious and significant. The case had been ordered to proceed urgently, yet the amended papers, trial bundle, skeleton arguments and authorities had not been served. There was no satisfactory explanation for the delay. The late request for medical information could have been made earlier.
3. All the circumstances. The defendant suffered clear prejudice. Although the claimant was vulnerable and had been badly let down by those representing him, that did not justify putting the hearing back when the claim was procedurally unready. Any prejudice arising from the new assessment could be addressed in fresh proceedings, subject to the ordinary judicial review permission stage.
4. The original assessment had been overtaken by the updated assessment. The court considered the convenience identified in Turgut where a new decision on similar facts may justify continuing proceedings on that basis, but held that such convenience did not warrant an adjournment or replacement grounds in the circumstances of this case.
5. The claimant was ordered to pay the defendant’s costs, summarily assessed at £1,700, subject to a determination under section 26 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 of his ability to pay for periods during which he was legally aided. The claimant’s legally aided costs were subject to detailed assessment.

This was a first-instance judicial review. The judgment records earlier permission and case-management orders, including an application to vacate the listed hearing which Master Gidden refused on 31 March 2017. No appeal was pursued.