W (A Child) (No 2), Re

Permission to appeal requires a real prospect of success or another compelling reason for the appeal to be heard. A certificate for a leapfrog appeal requires a sufficient case justifying an appeal to the Supreme Court under section 12 of the Administration of Justice Act 1969. Those requirements are not met merely because a party seeks to reopen issues recently determined by binding appellate authority. In adoption proceedings, the child’s welfare remains paramount, including where there have been failures or delay by State institutions. The court may grant a short stay to enable the Court of Appeal to consider a renewed application for permission before an irreversible step is taken.

Following the making of an adoption order in the proceedings concerning W, the father applied for a certificate under section 12 of the Administration of Justice Act 1969 for a leapfrog appeal to the Supreme Court. Alternatively, he sought permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal and a stay.

He advanced arguments concerning the threshold criteria, the compatibility of section 47(2) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 with articles 6 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, State failures and delay, the balance between birth and adoptive family interests, and post-adoption contact. The central questions were whether the proposed appeal had a sufficient basis for a leapfrog certificate, a real prospect of success, or another compelling reason for it to be heard.

1. Applications dismissed. The application for a certificate under section 12 of the Administration of Justice Act 1969 was refused because no sufficient case for an appeal to the Supreme Court had been made out. Permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal was refused because the proposed appeal had neither a real prospect of success nor another compelling reason for it to be heard.
2. The argument that section 47(2) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 was incompatible with Article 8 in circumstances of this kind had no real prospect of success. The judge’s approach was consistent with In re J (Children) (Care Proceedings: Threshold Criteria) [2013] UKSC 9.
3. The Court of Appeal authorities relied upon by the father were not in conflict with the Strasbourg jurisprudence or with In re B (A Child) (Care Proceedings: Threshold Criteria) [2013] UKSC 33. The relevant authorities had already been considered in the earlier judgment and were securely founded in decisions of the House of Lords, the Supreme Court and the Strasbourg court.
4. The submission that the State could not rely on its own failures, including failures concerning contact or reunification, was not the basis of the adoption application or the judge’s reasoning. In any event, the child’s welfare remained paramount and could take precedence over the claims of an unimpeachable parent, even where State failures had occurred.
5. The proposed grounds concerning the evaluation and weighting of the evidence did not identify an arguable error in the judge’s assessment. The matters sought to be raised had also been considered recently by the Court of Appeal, so there was no compelling reason for an appeal.
6. A stay was granted for 21 days from 12 April 2017, enabling the Court of Appeal to determine whether permission should be renewed before an irreversible step was taken. Any further or extended stay was for the Court of Appeal.

The judgment records that the substantive judgment was perfected and an order made on 12 April 2017:

• High Court (Family Division): the earlier judgment was Re W (A Child) [2017] EWHC 829 (Fam). The father then sought a leapfrog certificate, permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal and a stay.
• High Court (Family Division): the certificate and permission applications were dismissed, with a 21-day stay granted.