Vaidya v General Medical Council

A general civil restraint order may be extended for up to two years where the respondent continues to issue claims or applications that are totally without merit. The court must consider whether extension is appropriate, even where earlier extensions have been granted. Such an order may properly extend to Employment Tribunals as well as the courts where persistent and vexatious proceedings create the same need for protection. A party has no right to pursue persistent and vexatious claims against persons unconnected with the underlying dispute.

The General Medical Council applied to extend a general civil restraint order previously made against Dr Shreedhar Vaidya. The order had been extended on earlier occasions and was due to expire after a short further extension granted while Dr Vaidya was abroad. The GMC sought a further two-year extension and an extension covering proceedings in Employment Tribunals.

Dr Vaidya opposed the application, sought to revisit the earlier orders, and asserted a constitutional right to bring claims against GMC trustees and other individuals. The central issues were whether the statutory and procedural conditions for extending the restraint order were met and whether its scope could include Employment Tribunals.

1. Extension granted. The general civil restraint order was extended for a further two years and extended to cover proceedings in Employment Tribunals. Dr Vaidya was ordered to pay the costs of the application and the earlier hearing before Collins J, subject to assessment if not agreed.
2. Under CPR Practice Direction 3C paragraph 4.10, the court may extend a general civil restraint order where it considers an extension appropriate, but may not extend it for more than two years on any occasion. The court must consider whether extension is appropriate even where the order has already been extended.
3. The relevant circumstances were established by Dr Vaidya’s continued pursuit of claims, appeals and review proceedings described in the judgment as totally without merit or having no reasonable prospect of success. The persistence of that conduct, notwithstanding the existing order and penal notice, justified the further extension.
4. An order of this kind may extend to Employment Tribunals. The distinction between persistent and vexatious claims in courts and in tribunals would be artificial and unfair where the same protective purpose is engaged. The court relied on NMC v Harrold [2015] EWHC 2254 (QB).
5. The claimant could not use the application to re-argue the bases of the earlier orders. Nor did he have a constitutional right to bring persistent and vexatious claims against individuals who were not, and had never been, involved in his case.