Attorney General v Dumas

The High Court may entertain a citizen’s bona fide, arguable public-interest application seeking constitutional interpretation and review of alleged non-Bill of Rights unlawful action, even without a personal rights infringement. The jurisdiction arises from constitutional supremacy, the High Court’s status as a superior court of record and its supervisory role. It is not confined to section 14 redress. Procedural rules may provide a route for declarations against public bodies, and a wrongly commenced claim can be corrected by case management. Parliamentary approval cannot waive constitutional qualifications. Presidential immunity does not prevent review of the validity of an ultra vires act.

Mr Dumas brought a fixed date claim seeking interpretation of section 122(3) of the Constitution and declarations that two nominations to the Police Service Commission were invalid. He claimed no personal interest and relied on his interest as a citizen in constitutional compliance. Mohammed J dismissed the claim on the preliminary ground that the Civil Proceedings Rules 1998 did not provide jurisdiction for constitutional interpretation outside section 14 redress. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the claim could proceed as an administrative application under Part 56 and that any procedural error could be corrected under Part 26.8(3). The Attorney General appealed. The Board considered jurisdiction only, not the merits of the nominations.

The appeal was dismissed. The Board upheld the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that the High Court had jurisdiction to entertain the claim.

1. The Constitution is supreme and the courts must uphold constitutional supremacy and the rule of law. The High Court’s status as a superior court of record, with the powers of the former Supreme Court, and the express appeal jurisdiction concerning constitutional interpretation supported jurisdiction beyond the procedure for personal fundamental-rights redress under section 14.
2. The Court of Appeal correctly identified a public-interest constitutional review jurisdiction. A qualifying claim must be bona fide, arguable with sufficient merit to have a real prospect of success, grounded in a legitimate and concrete public interest, capable of effective disposal, and free from frivolity, vexation or abuse. Mr Dumas had an arguable case on a matter of public importance, was not a busybody, had no collateral purpose and demonstrated competence to litigate the issue.
3. The Civil Proceedings Rules 1998 provided a route under Part 56 for judicial review, constitutional redress and declarations involving public bodies. The fact that Part 62 did not govern the claim did not remove the underlying constitutional jurisdiction. The court could correct the procedural route under Part 26.8(3). The Board expressed a provisional view that the Judicial Review Act 2000 had not necessarily superseded constitutional declarations, but left that issue for the courts of Trinidad and Tobago.
4. Parliamentary approval of nominations did not prevent the courts determining the legal meaning of the constitutional qualification. If section 122(3) required the specified qualifications and experience, the President and House of Representatives could not waive those requirements. The Board did not decide whether the nominees satisfied them.
5. Section 38(1) did not prevent the courts examining the validity of presidential acts. A purported ultra vires act could be challenged as a nullity. The Attorney General’s arguments based on parliamentary approval and presidential immunity therefore failed. Costs were left subject to written submissions.

1. Privy Council: The appeal was dismissed on 8 May 2017. The Board held that the High Court had jurisdiction to entertain the constitutional public-interest claim.
2. Court of Appeal of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago: On 20 October 2014 the Court allowed the appeal and remitted the matter to proceed before the trial judge. Its reasons dated 22 December 2014 held that the claim could be brought as an administrative action under Part 56 of the Civil Proceedings Rules 1998.
3. High Court: Mohammed J dismissed the claim on 22 July 2014, holding that the procedural rules did not provide jurisdiction for constitutional interpretation outside proceedings under section 14.