Jollah, R (On the Application Of) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department

False imprisonment may be constructive. Physical force, a guard or locked doors are unnecessary where a formal legal process constrains a person’s freedom of movement. Whether compliance is truly voluntary, and whether an alternative means of escape is reasonable and lawful, depends on the facts.

An unlawful immigration curfew backed by criminal sanction and electronic tagging compelled the claimant to remain at home during specified hours. It therefore constituted false imprisonment, although he could physically leave and sometimes did. Damages for a home curfew are fact-specific and should not begin with a full-detention tariff. Both the appeal and cross-appeal were dismissed.

The claimant was subject to a nightly curfew from 3 February 2014 to 14 July 2016 pending potential deportation. The restriction was imposed under paragraph 2(5) of Schedule 3 to the Immigration Act 1971. Following the Court of Appeal’s decision in R (Gedi) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, the Secretary of State accepted that the statutory power did not authorise a curfew.

Lewis J held that damages for false imprisonment were recoverable and later assessed compensation at £4,000: [2017] EWHC 330 (Admin); [2017] EWHC 2821 (Admin). The Secretary of State appealed on liability. The claimant cross-appealed on quantum. The central questions were whether the unlawful curfew amounted to imprisonment and whether the damages award was inadequate.

The court unanimously dismissed both the Secretary of State’s appeal and the claimant’s cross-appeal.

1. False imprisonment requires imprisonment and the absence of lawful authority. Imprisonment means unlawful constraint on freedom of movement from a particular place. It may be constructive and need not involve physical force, bad faith or physical contact. Submission to a legal process can supply the necessary restraint.
2. Whether compliance with an instruction is voluntary is fact-specific. A formal Home Office notice, backed by the threat of criminal liability under section 24(1)(e) of the Immigration Act 1971 and electronic tagging, could overbear the claimant’s will. His ability to disobey, and his occasional breaches, did not prevent the restraint from amounting to imprisonment.
3. The requirement of complete restraint must be applied in context. Cases such as Bird v Jones and Robinson v Balmain New Ferry Co Ltd involved reasonable and lawful alternative routes or means of escape. Leaving the claimant’s home in breach of the curfew, with the risk of a fine or imprisonment, was not a reasonable alternative. The claimant was therefore falsely imprisoned during the curfew hours. The conclusion followed the statutory construction in R (Gedi) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2016] EWCA Civ 409, and approved the reasoning of Edis J in [2015] EWHC 2786 (Admin).
4. The court made observations that the domestic tort and Article 5.1 of the Convention involve distinct concepts. Their application may produce different outcomes. The court declined to align them.
5. Damages for false imprisonment have no general tariff and depend on the facts. The claimant was confined only at night in his own home and was free to come and go during the day. The trial judge properly considered the limited practical effects, the duration and the evidence. He was not required to start from an award for full detention and apply a discount. The award of £4,000 was not plainly wrong.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division) dismissed the Secretary of State’s appeal on liability and the claimant’s cross-appeal on damages.
2. High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division (Administrative Court) Lewis J held that damages for false imprisonment were recoverable, declining to grant a declaration: [2017] EWHC 330 (Admin). He later assessed compensatory damages at £4,000: [2017] EWHC 2821 (Admin).
3. Administrative Court Collins J ordered interim relief lifting the curfew on 14 July 2016.