IM (Pakistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

An unchallenged concession that an appellant entered an informal marriage agreement, together with unchallenged expert evidence that such agreements can create a risk of honour violence, does not compel a tribunal to find that risk established. The expert evidence addresses general possibility; whether the relevant family intends to act remains a factual question. A tribunal may revisit a factual concession in exceptional circumstances, but must alert the parties and allow further evidence and submissions. Where an error may have affected findings on risk or internal relocation, remittal may be preferable to appellate fact-finding. Failure to challenge expert evidence does not increase its value, although substantial weight and proper reasons are required if key conclusions are rejected. Remittal is discretionary.

The appellant, a Pakistani national, claimed asylum on the basis that he faced an honour killing after reneging on an agreement to marry. The respondent’s refusal letter accepted that he had agreed to become engaged. The appellant relied on expert country reports addressing honour-based violence, sufficiency of protection and internal relocation.

The First-tier Tribunal dismissed the appeal, finding only preliminary marriage negotiations, no relevant risk from the alleged attacks, and a safe internal relocation option. The Upper Tribunal found a material error of law in going behind the concession without notice, set aside the determination and remitted the case without preserved findings. The appellant argued that the Upper Tribunal should instead have remade the decision and allowed the appeal. The central issue was whether the concession and expert evidence required that outcome.

1. Appeal dismissed. The Upper Tribunal was entitled to remit the case. Even if it had been bound to accept the respondent’s concession and Professor Bluth’s expert evidence, it was not bound to conclude that the appellant faced a risk of an honour killing.
2. The expert evidence established only that an informal engagement could give rise to such a risk. Whether the family whose honour was said to have been violated intended to pursue the appellant was a factual issue. The alleged attacks by Mustafa Pasha had not been linked by the First-tier Tribunal to Waheeda Bibi’s family. The finding on internal relocation was also factual. Both findings might have been influenced by the First-tier Tribunal’s treatment of the concession and therefore required reconsideration by that tribunal rather than determination by the Upper Tribunal.
3. Neither tribunal was invariably bound to accept the concession. Carcabuk and Bla v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2000] Appeal No. 00TH01426 IAT recognised that a tribunal may raise doubts about a concession and, if it is maintained, should accept it. The guidance in Kalidas (agreed facts – best practice) [2012] UKUT 00327 (IAC) required the parties to be alerted if the concession was to be revisited, with an opportunity to call further evidence and make submissions. The error was the absence of notice, making remittal appropriate.
4. The failure to challenge the expert reports did not give them greater weight than they merited. Under SI (expert evidence – Kurd – SM confirmed) Iraq CG [2008] UKAIT 00094, expert evidence should generally receive significant weight, but a tribunal may reach a different view on key matters provided that proper reasons are given.
5. Remittal involved an exercise of discretion. Its exercise was not irrational, and the parties’ apparent agreement that remittal was the appropriate course further undermined the appeal.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): dismissed the appeal against the Upper Tribunal’s determination dated 22 July 2015.
• Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber): allowed the appeal against the First-tier Tribunal’s determination, set it aside without preserved findings, and remitted the case for rehearing.
• First-tier Tribunal: dismissed the appellant’s asylum appeal on 3 December 2013, following an earlier dismissal and remittal for rehearing.