Wilkinson, R. v

A defence under section 3 of the Criminal Law Act 1967 requires force directed to preventing an actual crime or threatened crime. A mistake that conduct is criminal, where the mistake is one of law rather than fact, cannot found that defence. A taxi fare is not lawfully due before the requested journey has been performed, unless the passenger has varied the destination by asking to leave. Returning a passenger to the starting point is not force used to prevent a fare offence. A judge need not leave a wholly speculative or fanciful defence to the jury.

The appellant, a London taxi driver, was convicted at the Crown Court at Blackfriars of false imprisonment and dangerous driving. He appealed only against the false-imprisonment conviction.

Following a dispute about the taxi heating, the complainant asked repeatedly to leave. The appellant refused, kept the taxi door locked and drove her back towards the pick-up point. His defence relied on section 3 of the Criminal Law Act 1967, on the basis that he believed she was seeking to avoid payment of the fare.

The appeal concerned whether the judge should have left that statutory defence to the jury, and whether the summing-up had wrongly removed factual issues from the jury.

1. Appeal dismissed. The conviction for false imprisonment was safe. The judge was correct not to leave a section 3 defence to the jury.

2. The complainant had neither committed nor threatened a relevant offence. A fraud based on obtaining a free taxi journey would, on these facts, have required an intention not to pay when she hailed the cab. There was no evidence of that. Making off without payment under section 3 of the Theft Act 1978 required the requested service to have been performed. The requested journey to Notting Hill was not performed, and the complainant had not altered the destination by asking to leave. Section 1 of the London Cab Act 1896 did not alter that conclusion.

3. R v Aziz [1993] Crim LR 708 and R v Morris [2013] EWCA Crim 436 were distinguishable. Each concerned a passenger who had been taken to the destination and then made off without payment, or was believed to have done so. The passage in Aziz concerning later driving by the taxi driver did not apply before the requested service had been performed.

4. An honest belief that the complainant was committing a fare offence could not assist the appellant. It would have been a mistake of law, not fact. Following R v Jones [2006] UKHL 16, such a mistake cannot found a defence under section 3(1) of the Criminal Law Act 1967. In any event, driving the complainant back to the starting point was not an act to prevent a crime.

5. The judge repeatedly directed the jury that the prosecution bore the burden of proving the absence of lawful excuse and that factual issues were for the jury. A judge has no duty to leave a speculative and fanciful defence to the jury.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Appeal against the false-imprisonment conviction dismissed.

• Crown Court at Blackfriars: The appellant was convicted, following a jury trial, of false imprisonment and dangerous driving.