Ali, R v

Local prevalence may aggravate a sentence only exceptionally. The court must assess the individual offence by its own harm and culpability. It requires focused external evidence, disclosed in good time, showing materially greater local harm, exceptional circumstances, and a just and proportionate basis for an increase.

For guilty-plea credit, the relevant question is when the defendant indicated a guilty plea at the first stage of proceedings, rather than the first opportunity to enter a plea on an indictment. A reduced ability to understand the allegation, or other unreasonable impediment to an earlier indication, may justify the maximum reduction.

The appellant pleaded guilty at Bradford Crown Court to causing death by dangerous driving contrary to section 1 of the Road Traffic Act 1988. He had driven at up to about 49 mph in a 30 mph city-centre area, undertaken traffic and sharply overtaken a delivery van near a pedestrian crossing, striking and killing a pedestrian.

He received 62 months’ imprisonment and an extended driving disqualification. His appeal against sentence challenged the offence categorisation under the sentencing guideline, the use of local community-impact evidence, the 20 per cent guilty-plea discount, and the length of disqualification.

1. Appeal allowed to the extent of varying the sentence. The court quashed the sentence of 62 months’ imprisonment and substituted 58 months. It reduced the extended driving disqualification to seven years and three months under section 35 A of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988.

2. The sentencing judge was entitled to place the dangerous driving between levels 1 and 2 of the applicable guideline. The appellant’s grossly excessive speed, undertaking, sharp overtaking manoeuvre, approach to an evident pedestrian crossing, and the urban environment created a high degree of danger. The court rejected the contention that the conduct created only a significant, rather than substantial, risk. A sentence towards the top of the level 2 range was appropriate.

3. The judge erred by aggravating sentence for community impact. The court followed R v Bondzie [2016] EWCA Crim 552: prevalence requires timely disclosure of focused external evidence and is exceptional. The police statement had not been disclosed to the defence before sentence. It was also too general, since it did not show an exceptionally high prevalence of deaths caused by dangerous driving as distinct from general road-traffic fatalities. The proper post-trial sentence, after mitigation, was six and a half years.

4. The appellant did not qualify for the maximum one-third guilty-plea reduction under the guideline exception. He could have indicated at an earlier stage that all matters apart from whether the driving was dangerous or careless were conceded. However, the judge at the pre-trial preparation hearing had preserved the appellant’s position on credit pending service of the collision investigator’s report. A 25 per cent discount was therefore appropriate, producing 58 months’ imprisonment.

5. A five-year driving disqualification, extended to reflect custody, was not disproportionate on the facts. The reduced custodial term required the extended period to be adjusted, with credit for the interim disqualification already served.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Allowed the appeal against sentence to the extent of reducing imprisonment from 62 to 58 months and reducing the extended driving disqualification.
• Crown Court at Bradford: On 14 March 2018, imposed 62 months’ imprisonment following a guilty plea to causing death by dangerous driving, with an extended driving disqualification.