Coulter v Independent Press Standards Organisation CIC (IPSO) (Rev 1)

Judicial review assesses the lawfulness of a private regulatory body’s decision; it does not substitute the court’s view on the merits. Where a regulator has a discretionary power to consider third-party complaints, it may decline to investigate where the person most closely involved has not made a complaint and reliable evidence or participation is lacking. A decision-maker need not consider material whose relevance is merely tangential, particularly where doing so would cause delay and disruption. In assessing accuracy, factual statements do not become opinion merely because they appear in an opinion article. The regulator may assess words in their context. A duty to take care to avoid inaccurate or misleading publication is distinct from the separate question whether an inaccuracy is significant enough to require correction.

The claimant sought judicial review of decisions by the Independent Press Standards Organisation’s Complaints Committee and Independent Reviewer concerning complaints about articles in The Times and The Sunday Times. The complaints alleged inaccurate or misleading reporting of a House of Lords campaign meeting, including reporting concerning Baroness Tonge’s conduct and views.

The claimant challenged IPSO’s refusal to determine third-party complaints about Baroness Tonge, its refusal to consider a later House of Lords report, and its treatment of passages in opinion articles under clause 1 of the Editors’ Code. The court also considered, without deciding, whether IPSO was amenable to judicial review.

1. The court assumed, without deciding, that IPSO’s decisions were amenable to judicial review. The jurisdiction issue had not been fully argued and was better left open.

2. Regulation 8 conferred a discretion, rather than a duty, to consider third-party complaints. IPSO had to take into account the position of the party most closely involved. It was lawful to decline complaints concerning Baroness Tonge’s conduct after she had not made a complaint herself, particularly because IPSO lacked compulsory investigative powers and findings could materially affect her reputation. The decision was not an unlawful fetter on discretion.

3. IPSO had no general inquisitorial duty to obtain the House of Lords report. Its relevance was at most tangential, the report concerned different standards, and IPSO already had the meeting’s video and transcript. The decision not to reopen or delay the process was rational and did not breach any duty of sufficient inquiry.

4. A passage does not cease to be factual merely because it appears in an opinion piece. IPSO was nevertheless entitled to assess the passages in context and to conclude that particular statements were comment or opinion, or were not significantly misleading.

5. Clause 1(i) imposed a duty to take care to avoid inaccurate, misleading or distorted information; it did not impose an absolute duty to make every publication completely accurate. The extent of any inaccuracy could bear on whether due care had been taken. Clause 1(ii) separately addressed whether an inaccuracy was significant enough to require correction. IPSO’s approach disclosed no irrational conflation of those provisions.

6. The claim was dismissed. Permission to amend the grounds to add a private law claim and to transfer the proceedings was refused.