Rollerteam Ltd & Anor v Riley & Anor

Where a prior judgment has identified contractual promises but ambiguity remains about their scope, the court conducting the consequential inquiry may construe the findings by reference to the documents forming part of the agreement and the relevant contractual context. A promise to pay legal costs borne by another party may include billed and unpaid costs, unbilled work in progress, and reasonably necessary future work required to conclude the litigation. A reimbursement obligation is not limited by the identity of the person who made the payment, provided the payment was made on behalf of the person entitled to reimbursement. Clear temporal wording is required before a continuing promise is treated as ending at the date of judgment.

The judgment concerned an inquiry ordered after a trial determining that the parties had reached a binding settlement on 11 April 2013. The inquiry was directed to establish the sums due from John Aidiniantz under promises identified in the earlier judgment, including legal costs, mortgage payments and household expenses. The earlier proceedings had involved four claims concerning a family dispute about control of the Sherlock Holmes Museum.

The principal issues were whether the inquiry was confined to quantification, whether Mr Aidiniantz was personally liable, and how the settlement promises were to be construed. The court also considered the effect of related Tomlin orders and subsequent payments.

1. Scope of the inquiry. The court was bound by the Deputy Judge’s findings of fact but could construe the promises where their scope was ambiguous. It could consider the 8 April 2013 email and documents executed on 11 April 2013 as part of the settlement context. The promises were personal promises made by Mr Aidiniantz, even where Rollerteam was identified as the proposed payer.
2. Legal costs. The promise to pay costs borne by Ms Riley covered all four claims. In context, “borne” included costs already paid, billed but unpaid costs, unbilled work in progress and future costs reasonably necessary to bring the litigation to an end. The payment of £172,998.56 did not discharge the obligation because there was no agreement that it was accepted in full settlement. The sum due was £183,849.63.
3. Mortgage payments. The promise to reimburse mortgage payments for 1 Parkgate Road had no end date and extended beyond April 2013. Payments made through an agent or third party at Ms Riley’s request were payments made by her for the purposes of the agreement. The balance due was £69,019.92.
4. The promises concerning 1 Albion Mews and 30 Wimbledon Road likewise imposed personal liability on Mr Aidiniantz. For 30 Wimbledon Road, the promise concerned payments under the existing mortgage in Ms Riley’s name, regardless of whether Ms Decoteau or Ms Riley was the ultimate recipient. The sums due were £5,000 and £54,636.88 respectively.
5. The fixed household-expenses promise produced liability of £32,000, less £25,000 already paid. A balance of £7,000 remained payable.

The court determined that the total sums specified in the judgment were payable and directed that consequential issues be addressed at hand-down.

The judgment arose from an inquiry ordered by a Deputy Judge of the Chancery Division on 4 June 2015 following the trial judgment determining that a binding settlement had been reached. The judgment records that an appeal against aspects of that order was dismissed in December 2016, but gives no citation for the appellate decision.