LA v X & Ors (Fact Finding Death and Physical Harm)

In fact-finding proceedings, the local authority bears the burden of proving disputed facts on the balance of probabilities. The court must decide whether an event occurred; findings cannot rest on speculation, suspicion or a finding that something merely might have happened.

Medical evidence must be assessed with the whole evidential picture, including credibility, proper inferences, risk factors and protective factors. The court must consider the possibility of an unknown cause where appropriate. Lies may support a finding only where the relevant safeguards are satisfied, and they are not direct proof of guilt. A general threshold concession should be tied to the pleaded facts supporting it.

The local authority brought care proceedings concerning three children after their four-month-old sibling died following catastrophic head injuries. The deceased child had also sustained an earlier subdural haemorrhage, and his twin brother had rib fractures of two different ages.

The court conducted a ten-day fact-finding hearing concerning the causes of the injuries, the father’s violence towards the mother, and the mother’s alleged failure to protect the children. The mother accepted that the children had suffered or were likely to suffer emotional harm from exposure to domestic abuse, but disputed physical-harm findings and the extent of her failure to protect.

The central issues were whether the father had inflicted the injuries, whether the mother had failed to obtain medical attention or protect the children, and whether the threshold criteria were established.

1. Findings and outcome. The court found on the balance of probabilities that Y had forcibly shaken D on 2 June 2017, causing fatal injuries, and had previously shaken D causing an earlier subdural haemorrhage. Y had also inflicted two sets of non-accidental rib fractures on C. The mother had not physically harmed the children. The threshold criteria were made out.
2. Burden and standard of proof. The local authority bore the burden of proving the disputed facts. The parents were not required to establish alternative explanations. The applicable standard was the simple balance of probabilities. Inherent probability was relevant when weighing the evidence, but the court could not make a finding that an event merely might have occurred.
3. Assessment of evidence. Findings had to be based on evidence and proper inferences, viewed in the context of the whole case. The court was not confined to expert evidence and had to assess witness credibility, risk factors and protective factors. Medical opinions had to be evaluated alongside lay evidence, with appropriate regard to the possibility of an unknown cause.
4. Lies and discrepancies. A lie about one matter did not establish that the witness had lied about everything. Lies were not direct proof of guilt. Following H-C (Children), a lie could corroborate a case only if it was deliberate, concerned a material issue and was motivated by a realisation of guilt and fear of the truth. Repeated discrepancies required careful evaluation because they might arise from dishonesty, faulty recollection, stress, inaccurate recording, delay or story-creep.
5. Threshold concessions. A general concession that threshold criteria were crossed did not remove the need to establish the factual foundation for that concession. Detailed findings were important for future assessment and welfare decision-making.
6. Application. The mother failed to protect A from emotional harm caused by exposure to domestic abuse, but the evidence did not establish that she knew or ought to have known that Y posed a physical risk to the children, or that she had failed to protect D from further physical injury. The court also declined to find that she should have obtained medical attention for C’s apparently accidental eye mark.