A, Re (Wardship: 17 year old: s.20 accommodation)

The High Court may use wardship for a child accommodated under Children Act 1989 section 20 where doing so is compatible with the statutory scheme and fills a genuine gap in protection. Wardship must not require accommodation by, or supervise the exercise of statutory functions by, a local authority, nor interfere with independent criminal justice powers. The decision is ultimately a welfare determination. In exceptional circumstances, wardship may provide a framework for continued court involvement and accountability, without controlling day-to-day decisions. The court may focus the wardship on a particular risk, such as decisions concerning a child’s possible involvement as a criminal witness.

A, aged 17, had been accommodated by the local authority under section 20 of the Children Act 1989 after experiencing homelessness, gang-related coercion, violence and serious risks connected with a possible criminal prosecution. Care and secure accommodation proceedings had previously been issued, but a care order was no longer available after A reached 17. The local authority proposed continued section 20 accommodation and accepted that wardship could be made for a limited purpose. The father, A and the Children’s Guardian supported wardship. The central issue was whether the inherent jurisdiction could be used compatibly with the statutory scheme to protect A and provide appropriate oversight until he reached 18.

1. The court made A a ward of court until his eighteenth birthday. The order was directed principally to the exceptional risks associated with the potential criminal prosecution and did not confer parental responsibility on the court where the father’s existing parental responsibility was uncertain.

2. The inherent jurisdiction is subject to the limits in section 100(2) of the Children Act 1989. It cannot be used to require a child to be accommodated by a local authority, to supervise the local authority’s exercise of statutory discretion, or to confer such power on the authority. The court may nevertheless fill a statutory gap or supplement statutory powers where wardship does not conflict with another statutory scheme.

3. The use of wardship is a welfare decision. The child’s welfare is paramount, and the court must assess the child’s interests in the widest sense. The exceptional nature of A’s history, the uncertainty about parental responsibility, the absence of his mother, the limited role of the section 20 accommodation framework and the serious risks connected with possible witness involvement justified wardship.

4. Wardship did not authorise day-to-day supervision of accommodation, schooling or medical treatment. The local authority remained responsible for its statutory obligations, and prosecuting authorities retained responsibility for decisions concerning investigation, disclosure and calling witnesses. The purpose of wardship was to ensure that relevant decision-makers knew of the court’s interest, reported significant decisions and accounted for compliance with their statutory duties.

5. A child accommodated under section 20 is a looked-after child under section 22 and may qualify for continuing support under the Children Leaving Care Act 2000 and associated regulations. The interim care order continued under section 38(4) until disposal of the care application, but no care order could be made after A reached 17 because of section 31(3).

6. The court reserved further applications to itself. It declined to authorise further disclosure of A’s information to the police. Any further request for information was to be made by application, and the court was to be informed of the decision concerning A’s involvement in criminal proceedings and of compliance with relevant statutory obligations.

First-instance decision. The judgment records earlier directions and interim orders in the Family Court and High Court, but no appeal from an earlier judgment.