Craven v Davies (Rev 1))

Failure by a pedestrian to use a designated crossing does not, without more, constitute contributory negligence. The question depends on the road layout, traffic, lighting, visibility and the circumstances of the crossing. A pedestrian’s conduct is judged by reference to a sober person, although intoxication may remain relevant to the assessment of what occurred.

For dependency claims arising from a separated marriage, the claimant must establish a significant chance of reconciliation, rather than a merely speculative possibility. If that threshold is met, the chance is assessed as a percentage and applied to the dependency. Children may recover a modest sum for the loss of intangible benefits, including parental love and affection.

The claimant, the widow and dependant of the deceased, brought claims under the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934 and the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 following his death after being struck by the defendant’s vehicle. Primary liability was admitted, but contributory negligence, the prospect that the claimant and deceased would have reconciled, and the children’s claim for loss of intangible benefits remained in issue.

The parties had separated, divorce proceedings had begun, and a decree nisi had been pronounced before the accident. The central questions were whether there had been a significant chance of reconciliation and whether the children could recover for lost intangible benefits.

1. Contributory negligence. The deceased was not contributorily negligent. Not using the nearby Puffin crossing was not negligence per se. The relevant circumstances included the dual carriageway’s construction, light traffic at about 1 am, street lighting and an unobstructed view of about 300 metres. A sober person could reasonably have assumed that an approaching vehicle was travelling broadly within the speed limit. The deceased therefore acted reasonably in beginning to cross when the defendant was more than 200 metres away. The accident was caused wholly by the defendant’s negligent driving.
2. Prospect of reconciliation. Applying Davies v Taylor [1974] AC 207, the claimant had to show a significant chance of reconciliation, contrasted with a speculative possibility. If that threshold were satisfied, the court would assess the prospect in percentage terms and apply it to the dependency. On the evidence, the marriage had been in serious difficulty for a considerable period. The claimant had decided to divorce before the deceased’s later abusive conduct and affair, pursued the divorce, obtained a non-molestation order, and did not retreat from her decision. The deceased’s expressions of love did not amount to practical steps towards reconciliation. The chance of reconciliation was no more than speculative.
3. Quantum. The claimant’s dependency claim was therefore limited to maintenance payments, assessed at £10,500 per annum, together with the agreed bereavement award, memorial costs and funeral expenses.
4. Intangible benefits. The children’s claim was distinguished from the claim rejected in Mosson v Espousal (London) Ltd [2015] EWHC 53 (QB). Following the reasoning in Beesley v New Century Group Ltd [2008] EWHC 3033 (QB) and the line of authority beginning with Hay v Hughes [1975] QB 790, the court could award a modest sum where children had lost the love and affection their father would have provided. £5,000 was awarded for each child. Additional sums for possible gifts and wedding contributions were too speculative and remote.
5. Judgment was entered for the claimant in the sum of £101,514.18, inclusive of interest.

First-instance judgment. No prior appellate decision is stated in the judgment.