Hayes v Solicitors Regulation Authority (Rev 1)

A framework contract approved under a parliamentary expenses scheme must be interpreted in its contractual and regulatory context. Where it authorises legal and constitutional advice on matters relating to an elected representative’s parliamentary activities, it does not operate as a general solicitor’s retainer. The phrase “in particular” may be read restrictively where the contractual wording and drafting history show that the following description defines, rather than illustrates, the services covered.

For a professional-conduct allegation based on use of funds for unauthorised purposes, the relevant questions are whether the services fell outside the contract and whether the solicitor knew or suspected that they did. It is unnecessary to establish knowledge of dishonest expense claims or to analyse whether the solicitor suspected that the parliamentary authority itself had prohibited payment.

The appellant, a solicitor and partner in a law firm, represented a Member of the European Parliament in criminal, public law and civil proceedings. The firm received payments from the European Parliament under a framework contract for legal and constitutional advice on matters relating to the member’s activities as an MEP.

The Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal found that the appellant had permitted European Parliament money to fund three matters outside the contract, while knowing or suspecting that they were unauthorised. It found breaches of the applicable professional-conduct rules and struck him off the Roll of Solicitors.

The appellant appealed under section 49 of the Solicitors Act 1974, challenging the construction of the contract, the meaning and application of suspicion, and the tribunal’s approach to the issues.

1. Appeal dismissed. The tribunal asked itself the correct questions and was entitled to reach its findings.
2. The contract was not a general solicitor’s retainer. It was a framework contract generated and approved under the European Parliament’s expenses arrangements. Article 2 defined the services covered as legal and constitutional advice on matters relating to the member’s activities as an MEP.
3. Although “in particular” may ordinarily introduce examples, the wording, drafting history and purpose of article 2 showed that it did not qualify the words relating to the member’s MEP activities. Those words clarified what was already implicit and restricted the contract’s scope. Article 1, concerning the firm’s freedom and independence, did not enlarge that scope.
4. The allegation that the appellant used funds for purposes not authorised by the contract was sufficiently clear. It referred to services outside article 2 and therefore outside the services pre-authorised for reimbursement. The tribunal did not need to investigate the wider detail of the European Parliament’s expenses policy.
5. The tribunal’s findings on the separate allegations concerning false documents and dishonest expense claims were not inconsistent with its finding on Allegation 3. Allegation 3 required proof that the services were outside the contract and that the appellant knew or suspected that fact. It did not require proof that he knew or suspected that the member was making dishonest claims.
6. “Suspicion” was an ordinary word in this context and required no special legal analysis. The tribunal identified adequate factual foundations for its findings concerning the Court of Appeal proceedings and the pre-1 September 2005 European Court work. In relation to the Rance claim, the tribunal found knowledge rather than suspicion.
7. The tribunal was not required to decide whether it was arguable that the services fell within the contract, or whether the appellant knew or suspected that it was not arguable. The relevant questions were the true scope of the contract and the appellant’s knowledge or suspicion that the services fell outside it.

The application to amend the grounds of appeal was refused. The additional arguments did not disclose any error of law.

• High Court (Administrative Court): The appeal from the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal’s determination dated 13 September 2017 was dismissed. The tribunal’s strike-off and costs orders were left undisturbed.