Molodi v Cambridge Vibration Maintenance Service & Anor

An appellate court may interfere with a trial judge’s findings of fact where the relevant conclusion is an inference from established facts, or where the evidence presents the rare clear case in which the claimant’s evidence cannot safely be accepted. In low-velocity injury claims, medical evidence depends on an accurate account of previous accidents, symptoms and treatment. Material dishonesty, serious inconsistencies and exaggeration may mean that the claimant has failed to prove the claim. Where the statutory test is satisfied, Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, section 57 requires dismissal of the entire personal injury claim, subject to the statutory framework.

The defendants appealed against the judgment of HHJ Main QC dated 18 April 2016, which awarded Mr Molodi £4,397 for injuries and losses arising from a road traffic collision. Primary liability for the collision was admitted, but the defendants disputed causation, the extent of injury and the reliability of the claimant’s evidence.

The claimant had made materially inconsistent accounts in the claim notification form, medical evidence, witness statement and oral evidence. He had failed to disclose several previous accidents, claimed vehicle losses exceeding the repair cost he accepted, and claimed physiotherapy and loss-related matters inconsistently. The central issues were whether the appellate court could interfere with the trial judge’s factual conclusions, whether the claimant had proved injury and loss, and whether the claim was fundamentally dishonest within section 57 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015.

1. Appeal allowed; claim dismissed. The defendants were entitled to argue that the claimant had failed to prove his case, notwithstanding the absence of an express plea of fraud or dishonesty. The claimant had been given a proper opportunity to address the factual matters relied upon.

2. Under Civil Procedure Rules 1998, rule 52.21, an appeal is ordinarily a review. The appellate court may draw justified inferences from the evidence. It should give particular weight to findings based on the trial judge’s assessment of witnesses, but may form its own view where the finding is an inference from established facts. Reversal of a credibility-based conclusion requires a very clear and exceptional case.

3. The guidance in Casey v Cartwright [2006] EWCA Civ 1280 identified the appropriate procedure where causation is challenged in a low-velocity impact case. The absence of that procedure did not prevent the defendants from relying on the evidential weaknesses in the claim, but it meant that the medical and engineering evidence was limited.

4. The claimant’s failure truthfully to disclose previous accidents was fundamental. Accurate medical history was essential to assessing causation and the reliability of the alleged symptoms. That dishonesty, maintained in the witness statement and at trial, together with the inconsistent accounts of injury duration, vehicle damage, rehabilitation and work, meant that the evidence could not safely support the claim.

5. The statutory test in section 57 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 was satisfied. The claimant had acted dishonestly in relation to the primary and related claims, substantially affecting their presentation in a way that potentially adversely affected the defendants significantly. The entire claim therefore had to be dismissed under section 57(2). Independently, the claimant had failed to prove his case.

• High Court (Queen’s Bench Division): Appeal from the judgment and order of HHJ Main QC dated 18 April 2016. The High Court allowed the appeal and dismissed the claim.