Richards & Anor v Morris

An appellate court may reverse factual inferences where the weight of the evidence shows that the lower court’s conclusion was unsustainable, although it must be slow to interfere with findings based on witness credibility. In low-value personal injury claims, claimants must prove injury and causation. Demonstrable untruths, serious inconsistencies, inaccurate medical histories and unsustainable claims for special damages may collectively prevent the claimant from proving the claim. A trial judge who finds evidence to be hopelessly inconsistent must explain how that evidence can nevertheless establish injury and duration. Judicial experience may assist in evaluating evidence, but cannot replace properly proved expert or factual evidence about accident mechanics or medical causation.

The defendant appealed against the judgment of HHJ Main QC dated 11 April 2016. The judge had awarded each claimant £2,500 for soft-tissue injuries arising from a low-speed road traffic collision, while disallowing their claims for special damages.

The defendant argued that the claims should have been dismissed because the claimants had given materially inconsistent or untruthful accounts, including about their medical histories, previous accidents, medical treatment and claimed losses. She also argued that the trial judge had relied impermissibly on the separation of the vehicles and a medical finding of spasm without appropriate expert evidence. The central issues were whether the claimants had proved genuine accident-related injury and whether the appellate court should dismiss the claims, order a retrial or make findings of fundamental dishonesty.

1. Appeal allowed. The claimants had failed to prove their claims. The court dismissed both claims but made no finding of fundamental dishonesty because the appellate judge had not seen or heard the claimants give evidence.
2. Under CPR 52.21, an appeal is a review. An appellate court should generally respect findings depending on the trial judge’s assessment of witnesses, but may draw its own inferences from established facts and may intervene where the weight of the evidence shows that the decision was wrong or unjust.
3. The trial judge had found the first claimant’s evidence to be hopelessly inconsistent, yet accepted her evidence that she had suffered an eight-month injury. Applying the reasoning in Yaqoob v Royal Insurance UK Limited [2006] EWCA Civ 887, the judge was required to explain how evidence rejected on important matters could nevertheless establish injury and duration. Similar problems affected the second claimant’s evidence.
4. The cumulative evidence was decisive. Neither claimant obtained ordinary medical treatment consistent with the alleged injuries; both gave inaccurate medical histories; the second claimant falsely stated that he had sought medical attention and undergone physiotherapy; and both maintained claims for treatment which was not undertaken or was inconsistent with their alleged recovery. The first claimant also maintained a vehicle-loss claim despite having been compensated after the vehicle was stolen.
5. The trial judge placed insufficient weight on vehicle separation and Dr Iqbal’s finding of muscle spasm. Judicial knowledge may assist in understanding evidence, but cannot establish the mechanics of a collision or medical causation where the evidence is inadequate. The medical reports were formulaic and based on materially incomplete histories, so the isolated finding of spasm could not prove the claims.
6. A retrial was unnecessary. The proper order was judgment for the defendant on both claims, without a finding of fundamental dishonesty.

• High Court (Queen's Bench Division): Appeal from the judgment and order of HHJ Main QC dated 11 April 2016. The appeal was allowed and both claims were dismissed.