Ubbi & Anori (Minors) v Ubbi

Under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975, an infant child’s claim is for reasonable financial provision for maintenance. Maintenance is flexible and need not be confined to subsistence, but it does not extend to everything desirable or to providing capital for its own sake.

An infant child has no statutory priority over other beneficiaries. The court must assess all relevant matters under section 3, balancing competing needs in the circumstances of the particular case. A claim by an infant child is nevertheless a vital part of the factual matrix. Guidance from Schedule 1 of the Children Act 1989 may assist, but cannot determine a claim under the 1975 Act.

The claimants were the two very young children of Malkiat Singh Ubbi. Their father’s will pre-dated their births and made no provision for them. They claimed a lump sum from his estate under section 2 of the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975.

The defendant, the deceased’s widow and personal representative, accepted that provision should be made but disputed the amount. The principal disputes concerned housing, childcare, private education, the mother’s contribution, and the competing needs of the deceased’s disabled adult son. The court also considered the significance of testamentary freedom and whether joint-tenancy assets should be brought into the estate under section 9.

1. Statutory approach. The claimants fell within section 1(1)(c) and were entitled only to such financial provision as it was reasonable for them to receive for their maintenance under section 1(2)(b). The court had to consider the matters in section 3, including the children’s resources and needs, the resources and needs of beneficiaries, the deceased’s obligations, the size and nature of the estate, and education under section 3(3).
2. Maintenance. Maintenance is a flexible concept assessed on the facts. It is not limited to subsistence, but it does not include everything desirable and does not justify conferring capital on a non-spouse claimant. A lump sum is properly treated as capitalised maintenance.
3. Infant children. The Act does not make an infant child’s needs a first or paramount consideration. The needs of infant claimants and infant beneficiaries must be balanced in the round. The fact that the claimants were infants was nevertheless a vital part of the factual matrix, particularly because they depended on others for financial, physical and emotional support. Birth within or outside marriage was irrelevant as such, although the deceased’s treatment of the child could be relevant.
4. Comparative guidance. Schedule 1 applications under the Children Act 1989 could provide general guidance, but were not determinative because that jurisdiction was wider than maintenance under the 1975 Act.
5. Application. The court accepted the need for substantial housing and professional childcare costs. It rejected private-school fees as reasonable financial provision on the evidence. It took account of the mother’s agreed contribution, the disabled adult beneficiary’s needs, the estate’s value, the parties’ standard of living and the deceased’s obligations to both families. The agreed lump-sum methodology was applied, producing an award of £386,290.60.
6. Final order. The estate was ordered to pay £386,290.60 to provide reasonable financial provision for the claimants. The claimants could not reopen their contribution concession after circulation of the draft judgment.

First-instance decision. No appellate history was stated in the judgment.