Sheffield City Council v Crump & Ors

[2018] EWHC 1411 (QB)

Case details

Case citations
[2018] EWHC 1411 (QB)
Court
High Court (Queen's Bench Division)
Judgment date
7 June 2018
Judgment text

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Subjects
Public law Civil procedure Contempt of court
Keywords
contempt of court breach of injunction undertakings safety zone tree felling criminal standard of proof sentencing for contempt suspended imprisonment
Outcome
application granted in respect of simon crump, fran grace and benoit compin; crump and compin sentenced to two months’ imprisonment suspended for one year, and grace given no further punishment. judgment reserved for paul brooke; costs reserved.
Judicial consideration

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Summary

For contempt proceedings, the applicant must prove to the criminal standard that the defendant intentionally committed conduct contrary to a clearly stated order. Any reasonable ambiguity is resolved in the defendant’s favour.

A “safety zone” may be determined by the local authority or its contractor, provided the decision is made rationally and for genuine safety reasons. A defendant cannot substitute their own view of the appropriate location or challenge the underlying highway-maintenance decision collaterally in contempt proceedings.

Deliberate breaches may justify imprisonment, but imprisonment remains a last resort. A suspended sentence may be appropriate where further compliance can thereby be secured.

Factual background

Sheffield City Council applied to commit four individuals for contempt arising from protests against its tree-felling programme. This judgment concerned Simon Crump, Fran Grace and Benoit Compin; judgment was reserved in respect of Paul Brooke.

Crump and Brooke had given undertakings not to enter or obstruct safety zones. Grace and Compin were alleged to have breached an injunction against persons unknown. The alleged contempts concerned entering or remaining within safety zones, and preventing their erection.

The central issues were whether the relevant areas constituted safety zones, whether the defendants acted intentionally, and what sanctions were appropriate.

Held

  1. Contempt principles. The Council had to prove, to the criminal standard, intentional acts contrary to the undertaking or injunction. The prohibited conduct had to be clearly stated. If the order reasonably admitted more than one meaning, the meaning favourable to the defendants had to be adopted (para [19]).
  2. Meaning of safety zone. The location and extent of a safety zone were matters for the Council, or its contractor acting on delegated authority, provided the decision was made for genuine safety reasons and was not one which no reasonable contractor taking appropriate arboricultural advice could make. Relevant considerations included the work required, the tree canopy, personnel and vehicles. Reasonable views as to the precise area could differ (paras [28]–[30]).
  3. On 18 December 2017, Crump and Grace deliberately remained within an enlarged safety zone after being repeatedly asked to leave. The enlargement was rational and made for safety reasons. Both contempts were proved. The fact that their presence did not ultimately prevent felling went only to mitigation (paras [24]–[37]).
  4. On 10 January 2018, Compin intentionally entered and remained within a safety zone. His admission and the short duration of the incident did not prevent a finding of contempt (paras [38]–[40]).
  5. On 16 January 2018, Crump deliberately prevented barriers being erected where the contractor rationally considered them necessary. The undertaking prohibited preventing erection in that location; the possibility of using a different arrangement, known as “geckoing”, was irrelevant (paras [41]–[45]).
  6. On 5 March 2018, Compin’s collateral challenge to the Council’s decision to fell a particular tree could not affect the meaning of the injunction. The tree was a “tree to be felled” because the Council had followed its usual decision-making process. Any public law error would have required judicial review, not resistance to the injunction in contempt proceedings (paras [46]–[50]).
  7. Sanction. Imprisonment serves punishment and securing compliance, but is generally reserved for serious and contumacious flouting and is a last resort. Crump and Compin were each sentenced to two months’ imprisonment suspended for one year. Grace’s contempt finding was sufficient sanction. Costs were reserved pending judgment concerning Brooke (paras [54]–[74]).

The court’s approach to earlier authorities

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Appellate history

The judgment records an earlier unsuccessful judicial review in R (Dillner) v Sheffield City Council, [2016] EWHC 945 (Admin), followed by the Council’s successful application for an injunction in Sheffield City Council v Fairhall, [2017] EWHC 2121 (QB). The present decision was a first-instance contempt determination.

Key cases cited

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Cases citing this case

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