Tapecrown Ltd, R (On the Application Of) v Oxford Crown Court

The Court of Appeal Criminal Division has jurisdiction under section 13 of the Administration of Justice Act 1960 only over orders made in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt. An order securing compliance with an earlier remediation order, and determining the costs of that process, is independent of punishment for contempt.

For section 29(3) of the Senior Courts Act 1981, a matter is excluded from judicial review only where it sufficiently concerns the conduct of a trial on indictment, pre-trial directions, or sentence. A mere procedural or factual link with a criminal case is insufficient.

Where an order establishes a self-contained mechanism for determining costs, a possible civil claim may nevertheless be an unsatisfactory alternative remedy. A decision refusing an extension of time may be quashed where it rests on factual errors, irrelevant matters, and failure to consider the consequences of refusal.

Tapecrown had pleaded guilty to environmental offences and was made subject to a remediation order. After it failed to comply, the Crown Court found it in contempt and made an order under rule 70.2A of the Civil Procedure Rules, appointing Grundons to remove waste at Tapecrown’s expense.

The Crown Court later refused to extend time for Tapecrown to challenge the reasonableness of Grundons’ charges. Tapecrown sought to appeal to the Court of Appeal Criminal Division under section 13 of the Administration of Justice Act 1960 and, alternatively, sought judicial review.

The central issues were whether either appellate jurisdiction or High Court judicial review jurisdiction existed, whether permission should be refused for delay or an alternative remedy, and whether the Crown Court had properly exercised its discretion.

1. Criminal appellate jurisdiction. The Court of Appeal Criminal Division had no jurisdiction under section 13 of the Administration of Justice Act 1960. The contempt jurisdiction had already been exercised when the Crown Court found Tapecrown in contempt and imposed punishment. The subsequent rule 70.2A order secured compliance with the earlier remediation order and was not part of the punishment process. The decision concerning the time for challenging costs was even further removed from contempt punishment. R v Seramuga [2005] 2 Cr App R 12 did not extend to the present facts.
2. The decision was not appealable as a sentence under Part 1 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968. Although the statutory meaning of sentence extends beyond penalties, the decision concerned implementation of a remediation order and was too remote from the sentence imposed for the offences.
3. Judicial review jurisdiction. The relevant question under section 29(3) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 was whether the decision affected the conduct of a trial on indictment, pre-trial directions, or sentence, or arose from the issue between Crown and defendant formulated by the indictment. Mere linkage to a criminal trial or sentencing process was insufficient. The dispute concerned the mechanism for paying a third party for remedial work, not an issue between the Crown and defendant at trial. The High Court therefore had jurisdiction. This approach followed In Re Smalley [1985] AC 622 and applied the helpful formulation in R v Manchester Crown Court ex parte DPP (1994) 98 Cr App R 461.
4. Permission and alternative remedy. There was no undue delay. A possible civil claim by Grundons was either technically unavailable or, in any event, not a satisfactory alternative remedy. Rule 70.2A established a self-contained mechanism for ascertaining and enforcing the costs. The integrated statutory scheme considered in R (Willford) v Financial Services Authority [2013] EWCA Civ 674 was materially different. Grosvenor Chemical Ltd v HSE [2013] EWHC 999 (Admin) was distinguishable because it involved no equivalent costs-assessment mechanism.
5. Merits. The phrase “the invoice” in paragraph 8 of the order meant the same final invoice contemplated by paragraph 9. This interpretation promoted consistency, avoided requiring a challenge to an interim document, and was favourable to the obligor. The relevant invoice was received on 11 July 2017, so Tapecrown required an extension of three days.
6. The Crown Court’s refusal to extend time relied on factual errors and irrelevant matters, and failed to address the material considerations. These included the short extension sought, the severe effect of refusal, the negligible prejudice to the Environment Agency or Grundons, Tapecrown’s prior objections, and the applicable procedural principles. The decision of 3 October 2017 was quashed and the matter remitted to the Oxford Crown Court to reconsider whether an extension should be granted and any consequential issues. Tapecrown was awarded £7,000 costs.

• Crown Court at Oxford: Made the remediation and rule 70.2A orders, then refused to extend time for Tapecrown’s challenge to Grundons’ costs.
• High Court (Administrative Court): Held that the Court of Appeal Criminal Division lacked jurisdiction, but that judicial review jurisdiction existed. Permission was granted, the decision of 3 October 2017 was quashed, and the matter was remitted to the Oxford Crown Court.