Jeddi v Sotheby's & Ors

In an interpleader concerning possession of a chattel, the court determines the parties’ comparative rights to possession, rather than absolute ownership alone. A person in possession has possessory title good against all but the true owner, a person claiming through the true owner, or someone with a prior subsisting right to possession. An agent’s authority is generally revocable, even where the contract describes it as irrevocable. The exception for an agent with an interest in exercising the authority does not apply where the agent’s only interest is earning commission. Revocation ends the purpose of a related bailment and the agent’s right to possession.

The claimant and the second defendant each claimed rights in a rock crystal jar held by Sotheby’s. The claimant asserted sole ownership and an immediate right to possession. The second defendant asserted a 25 per cent co-ownership interest. Sotheby’s interpleaded, and the court was directed to determine the parties’ rights and interests, including who had the immediate right to possession.

The court rejected the second defendant’s factual case that he had acquired a co-ownership interest through an earlier exchange. It accepted that the claimant had delivered the jar to him under an arrangement recorded in the Dubai Agreement, under which he was to consign it for sale and receive 25 per cent of the proceeds as commission. The central issues were the legal effect of that arrangement, whether the agency had been revoked, and which claimant had the immediate right to possession.

1. Outcome. The court found that the second defendant had no proprietary interest in the jar and no continuing right to possession. The claimant had the immediate right to possession.
2. The question of immediate possession was determined by comparing the competing possessory rights, rather than by deciding absolute title alone. A person in possession has a possessory title good against everyone except the true owner, a person claiming through the true owner, or a person with a prior and subsisting right to retain the chattel. The claimant was in possession before delivery to the second defendant, and the second defendant fell within none of the exceptions. The court relied on Parker v British Airways Board [1982] 1 QB 1004, Waverley Borough Council v Fletcher [1995] QB 334, Webb v Chief Constable of Merseyside Police [2000] QB 427 and Costello v Chief Constable of Derbyshire Constabulary [2001] 1 WLR 1437.
3. The Dubai Agreement authorised the second defendant to sell the jar as the claimant’s agent, provided for a commission if it was sold, and constituted a bailment for that purpose.
4. Applying Angove’s Pty Ltd v Bailey [2016] UKSC 47, [2016] 1 WLR 3179, the general rule was that the principal could revoke the agent’s authority. No exception applied. The second defendant’s interest was only a commercial interest in earning commission, which could not make the authority irrevocable.
5. The claimant revoked the authority by July 2014 at the latest. Once the agency ended, the purpose of the bailment also ended, and the second defendant’s right to possess the jar ceased.