The Law Society of England And Wales v Sheikh

The court has an inherent jurisdiction to restrain a vexatious litigant who persists, without reasonable cause, in bringing proceedings before inferior tribunals. That jurisdiction may be supported by Senior Courts Act 1981, section 37. The court may declare tribunal proceedings totally without merit and require their withdrawal where they are abusive, time-barred, or an attempt to circumvent an existing civil restraint order. A further civil restraint order may extend to proceedings in employment tribunals where the circumstances justify it.

The Law Society applied under CPR 8 and Part 23 for declaratory and injunctive relief against Anal Sheikh. She had brought several employment tribunal claims which, according to the Law Society, repeated earlier disputes and circumvented general civil restraint orders made in the High Court.

The application sought declarations that the claims were totally without merit, an order requiring their withdrawal, and restrictions on further proceedings without permission. The central issues were whether the High Court had jurisdiction to grant that relief in respect of employment tribunal proceedings and whether this was an appropriate case in which to exercise it.

1. Relief granted. The court held that the first employment tribunal claim was frivolous, vexatious and totally without merit. It sought to re-litigate matters conclusively determined in earlier proceedings, was an attempt to circumvent existing general civil restraint orders, and was plainly time-barred. The related appeals and the second and third claims were also totally without merit.
2. The court possessed an inherent jurisdiction to use coercive or injunctive powers against a vexatious litigant who persisted, without reasonable cause, in litigating before inferior tribunals. If a statutory basis was required, section 37 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 supplied it. The court also had jurisdiction to declare employment tribunal proceedings totally without merit and, where appropriate, to require the litigant to apply for their withdrawal. The judge relied on and endorsed the analysis in Harrold v Nursing and Midwifery Council [2016] IRLR 30, the second Harrold case, and Karen v Lane.
3. It was appropriate to exercise the jurisdiction. Relevant considerations included the defendant’s status as a vexatious litigant, her history of repeated restraint orders, the use of employment tribunal proceedings to evade those orders, and the wholly unmeritorious nature of the claims and applications.
4. The defendant’s attempts to challenge earlier High Court orders were inherently vexatious and misconceived. Those orders remained valid and had to be obeyed. The court rejected the argument that sections 111 and 112 of the Equality Act 2010 justified the claims, observing that the employment tribunal was a court which could determine whether claims should be issued and whether they were totally without merit.
5. The Law Society’s application was granted in the terms sought. The existing order was extended for two years, and the judgment and papers were to be sent to the Attorney General for consideration of an application under section 42 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 for an all proceedings order without limit as to time.

First-instance decision. No appellate history is stated in the judgment.