Powys County Council v Hurst

The statutory scheme for recovering council tax liability orders under the Council Tax (Administration and Enforcement) Regulations 1992 is self-contained and exclusive. A billing authority cannot bypass that scheme by applying to the County Court for an attachment of earnings order under the Attachment of Earnings Act 1971. A council tax liability order is not a judgment debt within that Act. The deliberate omission of pensions from the Regulations’ definition of earnings prevents attachment of a pension through another enforcement route. The Magistrates’ Court must consider available enforcement options within the statutory scheme, but need not require the authority to pursue an unavailable County Court remedy before considering committal.

Powys County Council appealed by way of case stated against a District Judge’s decision concerning enforcement of unpaid council tax. The District Judge had discharged a suspended committal order after concluding that the Council should first consider obtaining an attachment of earnings order against the respondent’s police pension under the Attachment of Earnings Act 1971.

The appeal raised whether a billing authority could apply to the County Court for such an order and whether the Magistrates’ Court was entitled to quash the committal because the Council had not exhausted that alternative.

1. Appeal allowed. The enforcement scheme for council tax liability orders under the Council Tax (Administration and Enforcement) Regulations 1992 is self-contained and exclusive. The authority could not enforce a liability order by resorting to methods outside that scheme.

2. A liability order did not fall within the definition of “judgment debt” in section 2(c) of the Attachment of Earnings Act 1971. It was not an order of a Magistrates’ Court for payment recoverable summarily as a civil debt, and section 2(c)(i) excluded the relevant Magistrates’ Court orders. Regulation 35(3) of the 1992 Regulations also provided that the amount covered by a liability order was enforceable under that Part and was not to be treated as a sum adjudged to be paid by order of the Court for the purposes of Part III of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980.

3. The definitions of “earnings” in the two instruments materially differed. Section 24 of the 1971 Act included sums payable by way of pension, whereas regulation 32(1) of the 1992 Regulations did not. The omission was deliberate. Permitting a billing authority to obtain a County Court judgment and then attach a pension would bypass the purpose of the statutory scheme.

4. The general principle that specific legislation governing a subject matter will ordinarily prevail over more general legislation supported that conclusion. The reasoning in Doe d Murray v Bridges and Lonrho Ltd v Shell Petroleum Co Ltd (No 2) was treated as supporting that principle.

5. The Magistrates’ Court was not entitled to quash the committal merely because the Council had not pursued an attachment of earnings order in the County Court. The matter was remitted to a District Judge other than District Judge Thomas for redetermination in accordance with the judgment.

Hickinbottom LJ agreed with Singh LJ’s analysis and conclusion. He explained that paragraph 13 of R (Woolcock) v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government had not decided the issue and did not make a liability order indistinguishable from a judgment debt.

The appeal was brought by way of case stated from the decision of District Judge Neil Thomas dated 18 February 2018. The District Judge had discharged an earlier suspended committal order. The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and remitted the matter to a different District Judge for redetermination.