Laws v Williams & Anor

A driver joining a dual carriageway must act as a reasonably competent driver, taking account of all road users and allowing a reasonable margin of safety. The standard is not assessed by the Bolam “two schools of thought” approach, and it does not require perfection or require one road user to be endangered to avoid risk to another. A clearway does not impose an absolute prohibition on stopping where it is reasonably judged unsafe to enter the main carriageway. In such circumstances, slowing or stopping may be necessary. A motorcyclist must maintain a safe distance and remain aware of traffic ahead when making rearward observations. Where the motorcyclist fails to do so, that conduct may constitute contributory negligence.

The claimant, Andrew Laws, was riding a motorcycle behind a car driven by the first defendant, Frances Williams, on a slip road joining the A12. Ms Williams slowed almost to a stop because she judged that entering the nearside lane would cause approaching traffic to alter speed or course. Mr Laws, who had been looking behind him and then accelerated, collided with the rear of her car and suffered serious injuries.

The negligence and contributory-negligence issues were ordered to be tried as preliminary issues. The central questions were whether Ms Williams had driven negligently by slowing or stopping on the slip road, and, if so, whether Mr Laws had contributed to the accident.

1. Judgment for the defendant. Ms Williams was not negligent in slowing or stopping on the slip road.

2. The applicable standard was that of the reasonably competent driver. There was no place for the “two schools of thought” approach associated with the Bolam test. The competent driver must consider the possible actions of other road users, but is entitled to a reasonable margin of safety. The standard does not require perfection or require the driver to endanger one road user to avoid risk to another.

3. The Highway Code and the Driving Standards Agency guidance were relevant evidence of good driving practice. The clearway restriction did not create an absolute prohibition on stopping. A driver who reasonably judged that entering the nearside lane would cause traffic to alter speed or course was entitled, and if necessary required, to slow down or stop.

4. On the facts, the approaching lorry was sufficiently close that Ms Williams could reasonably conclude that accelerating into the gap would require the lorry driver to brake. Her decision was made within a very short time and with regard to a vehicle ahead of her on the slip road. It was the decision of a reasonably competent driver. Hazard lights were not required in the momentary circumstances; the brake lights provided a reasonable warning.

5. Contributory negligence was considered in the alternative. Mr Laws had failed to keep a safe distance and had accelerated before looking ahead again. He assumed that Ms Williams would make the same judgment as he had made, despite the different acceleration capacities of a car and a motorcycle. Had liability been established against Ms Williams, Mr Laws would have borne 75 per cent of the responsibility.

First-instance decision. No prior appellate decision is stated in the judgment.