PA v CK & Ors

In reviewing a refusal of direct contact, the appellate court must review the decision below rather than determine the issue afresh. Permission should be refused where the judge applied the correct child-focused principles, assessed the evidence carefully and reached a conclusion that cannot be shown to be wrong. Contact is the child’s right, not the parent’s, and terminating or refusing direct contact requires careful consideration of the child’s welfare and available alternatives. The court may allow a period of respite where further litigation or premature contact would risk additional emotional harm. A parent with whom the child lives remains expected to promote the child’s relationship with the other parent.

The applicant father sought permission to appeal against an order made by HHJ Dowding on 30 January 2018. The order refused direct contact with his daughter, while providing for weekly Skype or telephone contact and permitting letters, cards and occasional gifts. The father also challenged other aspects of the order, but permission had already been refused on those grounds.

The dispute arose after years of highly conflicted litigation, unsuccessful therapeutic interventions and a period in which the child had refused to leave the car for contact. The central issue was whether the judge had been wrong to refuse immediate direct contact and to leave any progression dependent on future circumstances.

1. Permission to appeal refused. The court’s task was to review HHJ Dowding’s decision, not to decide the contact issue as if hearing it for the first time. The judge had seen the evidence, made findings about the parties and considered the child’s recent refusal to engage in contact. No proper basis had been shown for concluding that her decision was wrong (paras [17], [23], [25]).
2. The court accepted the child-focused principles identified below: contact is the child’s right rather than the parent’s; a relationship with the non-resident parent is ordinarily beneficial; and termination of contact is exceptional, requiring cogent reasons and consideration of available alternatives (para [13]). Those principles did not require an order for immediate direct contact where the child’s last experience had resulted in her refusing even to leave the car.
3. The judge was entitled to conclude that further litigation, a factual rehearing and premature direct contact would be harmful or counter-productive. A period of respite was justified after five years of conflict, multiple professional interventions and the child’s exposure to continuing litigation (paras [18]–[25]).
4. The proposed family separation clinic was not an appropriate route because it proceeded on a parental-alienation premise inconsistent with the judge’s factual findings. Reopening those findings would risk further damaging the child (para [22]).
5. The court nevertheless emphasised that the child’s mother and stepfather should encourage positive communication with the father and recognise that he remained the child’s father with a continuing role in her life (paras [20]–[24]). The request for an order under s. 91 (14) of the Children Act was rejected, although such an order might be considered if future applications were unwarranted or unreasonable. A transcript was directed to be circulated to the parties and the paternal grandmother (para [26]).

• High Court (Family Division): Permission to appeal against HHJ Dowding’s order of 30 January 2018 was refused. Permission had previously been refused on the proposed grounds concerning suspended change of residence and change of surname.