Matthews & Anor, R (on the application of) v City of York Council & Anor

A planning authority’s obligation under its consultation statement to notify an objector of a committee meeting may be discharged by sending an email where the objector has accepted email correspondence, even if receipt is disputed. Whether amendments require renewed consultation under the authority’s statement involves planning judgment, including whether they are significant or directly affect a neighbour. A planning officer’s report must fairly identify material considerations throughout the decision-making process. A correction confined to one issue may leave the committee materially misled on other issues. The court must refuse relief where it is highly likely that the outcome would not have been substantially different, but must not decide planning judgments which belong to the decision-maker.

The claimants sought judicial review of the Council’s decision to grant planning permission for the demolition of an existing care home and construction of a larger care home in York. They challenged the decision on grounds including failure to notify an objector of the planning committee meeting, failure to consult on amended plans, and errors in the officer’s report concerning local care-home need.

The court rejected the notification, consultation and city-wide care-need challenges. It found, however, that the officer’s report had materially corrected inaccurate local care-bed figures only in the context of flood risk and the sequential test, leaving the committee misled on the principle of development and the planning balance.

1. Ground 1. The First Claimant had a legitimate expectation under paragraph 10.10 of the Council’s Statement of Community Involvement to be advised of the planning committee meeting. That obligation was discharged by sending an email containing the relevant information, since he was content to correspond with the Council by email, even if the email had not in fact been received. The court also found, on the evidence, that it was received. Ground 1 was rejected.
2. Had there been a breach, prejudice would nevertheless have been absent on the particular facts. The authorities recognised the significance of an objector’s opportunity to address a planning committee, and caution was required before concluding that representations would have made no difference. Here, however, the same parking objections were later presented in relation to the resubmitted application and did not affect the outcome.
3. Ground 2. The challenge to the location of the crossing was not academic or premature. The planning permission incorporated the relevant plan, so any challenge to that location had to be made against the permission itself. Nevertheless, paragraph 10.6 of the Statement of Community Involvement required the planning officer to consider whether amendments were significant or would directly affect a neighbour. Those decisions necessarily involved planning judgment. The officer’s conclusion that the minor introduction of dropped kerbs and tactile paving did not directly affect the claimant was not shown to be irrational. Ground 2 was rejected.
4. Grounds 4 and 5. The governing approach to an officer’s report was to read it as a whole and in a common-sense manner, asking whether it fairly drew the committee’s attention to the law and material considerations. The correction of local care-bed figures was expressly presented as relevant to flood risk and the sequential test. It did not clearly correct the report’s treatment of the principle of development or the planning balance. The committee was therefore significantly misled on material matters. Ground 4 was made out.
5. The different city-wide care-need figures were adequately explained by their different bases, including assumptions about closures and pending applications. Ground 5 failed. Although section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 required consideration of whether relief should be refused, applying it would have required the court to determine planning issues reserved to the decision-maker. The planning permission was accordingly quashed.

First-instance judicial review. No appellate history is stated in the judgment.