KE & Ors, R (On the Application Of) v Bristol City Council

[2018] EWHC 2103 (Admin)

Case details

Case citations
[2018] EWHC 2103 (Admin)
Court
High Court (Administrative Court)
Judgment date
3 August 2018
Judgment text

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Subjects
Administrative law Public sector equality duty Duty to consult
Keywords
judicial review local authority budget special educational needs high-needs block public sector equality duty consultation duty of inquiry children’s welfare equality impact assessment quashing order
Outcome
claim succeeded; permission granted and high-needs budget allocation quashed
Judicial consideration

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Summary

When a local authority makes a significant, specific and financially rigid budget reduction affecting a defined group, relevant statutory and common-law duties may arise at the budget-setting stage. Later executive decisions about implementation do not postpone those duties where a material reduction in services is inevitable.

The Equality Act 2010 requires substantive due regard, reasonable inquiry into likely impact and, where necessary, consultation. Section 27 of the Children and Families Act 2014 and section 11 of the Children Act 2004 may impose additional duties. Fairness may also require consultation before withdrawal of existing provision. The failure to consult and inquire rendered the decision unlawful, and the high-needs budget allocation was quashed.

Factual background

Parents and children with special educational needs challenged Bristol City Council’s full-council decision to set the 2018/19 schools budget, including a reduction of approximately £5 million in the high-needs block. They alleged breaches of equality, children’s welfare and special educational needs duties, the common-law duty of fairness, and the duty of sufficient inquiry.

The Council argued that the relevant duties arose only when its executive later determined how services would be delivered, and relied on alternative remedy, delay and the likelihood that the outcome would have been unchanged. The central issue was whether the budget-setting decision itself was sufficiently focused and final to engage the duties.

Held

Permission was granted on all grounds and the claim succeeded. The high-needs budget allocation was quashed, with the Council required to reconsider it in light of the resources available at the material time.

  1. The full council’s statutory budget-setting function was distinct from later executive decisions about service implementation. The decision challenged was a significant, sufficiently focused and financially rigid reduction to a defined area of provision. It was therefore not merely an indicative funding envelope. The distinction between a budget and a flexible medium-term financial plan was material: R (Buck) v Doncaster MBC [2013] EWCA Civ 1190, and the cases concerning flexible plans, did not support postponing the duties.
  2. The public sector equality duty required substance rather than form. The Council had to take reasonable steps to understand the likely impact on children with protected characteristics. The duty of inquiry could require consultation. There was no adequate equality impact assessment or other evidence enabling members to understand the likely consequences of the reduction, and the statutory equality references in the report were insufficient.
  3. Section 27 of the Children and Families Act 2014 required review of the sufficiency of provision. A substantial reduction in the relevant budget necessarily raised that issue and triggered the statutory consultation duty.
  4. Fairness independently required consultation. The affected children formed an identifiable group receiving existing educational provision, and a substantial reduction inevitably threatened frontline services. A limited statutory consultation duty did not exclude the common-law duty.
  5. Section 11 of the Children Act 2004 applied to policy-setting as well as implementation. The Council had to have regard to, and actively promote, children’s welfare and had to demonstrate compliance. No evidence showed that members had done so. The irrationality ground also succeeded as an alternative consequence of the failure to obtain material information.
  6. The no-substantial-difference argument was rejected because the court could not predict what lawful consultation and inquiry would have produced. The individual appeal route under section 51 of the Children and Families Act 2014 was not an adequate alternative to a challenge to the funding decision itself. The claim was brought promptly.

The court’s approach to earlier authorities

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Key cases cited

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