Sabesan v London Borough of Waltham Forest

An application to extend time for an appeal to the High Court under regulation 43 of the 2009 Regulations is governed by principle. The court should apply the three-stage Denton approach, directly or by analogy, despite the permissive wording of regulation 43(2). The stages are the seriousness and significance of the default, the reason for it, and all the circumstances, including efficient and proportionate litigation and compliance with procedural rules. Financial difficulty and confusion about the correct route will not ordinarily justify a substantial delay where the appellant was clearly informed of the route and deadline. An appeal under regulation 43 is confined to a question of law. The High Court cannot substitute its assessment of weight for that of the tribunal and will interfere only on a public-law basis, such as irrationality.

The appellant sought an extension of time to appeal against a decision of the Valuation Tribunal for England refusing to authorise his late council-tax appeal. The VTE appeal had been made under section 16 of the Local Government Finance Act 1992 and required authorisation under regulation 21(6) of the 2009 Regulations. The High Court appeal under regulation 43 was filed five months late.

The issues were whether time should be extended and, if so, whether the VTE had erred in law when refusing authorisation. The court also considered, without needing to decide it, the substantive grounds of appeal.

1. Extension of time. The application was refused and the appeal dismissed. Regulation 43(2) confers a discretion which must be exercised by reference to principle. Its use of the words allowing an appeal to be dismissed, rather than requiring dismissal, does not justify a less rigorous approach than that applicable to other applications to extend time.
2. The correct approach was the three-stage process in Denton v TH White [2014] 1 WLR 3926, either directly or by analogy. The court considered the five-month delay serious and significant. The explanations offered, including financial hardship, continued proceedings in the Magistrates’ Court and confusion about procedure, did not provide an acceptable reason. The clear letter identifying the VTE and the two-month deadline was material.
3. At the third stage the court considered all the circumstances, including the factors in CPR 3.9: efficient and proportionate litigation and compliance with rules, practice directions and orders. Those considerations did not justify relief. The approach in Paul Turner v South Cambridgeshire District Council [2016] EWHC 1017 (Admin) was preferred to the less fully explained approach in Jagoo v Bristol City Council [2017] EWHC 926 (Admin).
4. Substantive appeal. Regulation 43(1) permits an appeal only on a question of law. Matters of weight were for the VTE, subject to Wednesbury unreasonableness. The appellant could not reargue the merits or substitute the High Court’s assessment for that of the VTE.
5. The reference in the VTE Practice Direction to acting with all reasonable speed could properly be treated as a factor relevant to whether delay arose from circumstances beyond the applicant’s control, rather than as an additional statutory hurdle. In any event, the VTE’s finding stood independently. There was no public-law basis for intervention.

The appeal was brought to the High Court from the Valuation Tribunal for England. The VTE had refused to authorise the appellant’s out-of-time appeal and the President had refused a review. The High Court dismissed the appeal and did not set aside the VTE decision.