Lewis v Tindale & Ors

A motor insurer’s compulsory liability under Road Traffic Act 1988, section 145, is geographically limited to use of a vehicle on a road or other public place. Driving on a road before deliberately entering private land is not, without more, a causative contribution to an accident on that land.

A conforming interpretation cannot remove that limitation where doing so would alter the legislation, create significant policy consequences and retrospectively impose criminal liability. However, Article 3 of Directive 2009/103/EC is unconditional and sufficiently precise. It has direct effect, at least to the minimum personal-injury cover required by Article 9. The Motor Insurers’ Bureau is an emanation of the State and may be liable for the unimplemented obligation.

The claimant suffered serious injuries when struck by an uninsured vehicle on private land after the driver had travelled on a public road and deliberately entered a field. The driver was debarred from defending the claim and his full liability was not disputed by the Motor Insurers’ Bureau.

The court tried preliminary issues concerning: whether the liability was within the compulsory insurance obligation under Part VI of the Road Traffic Act 1988; whether the Motor Insurers’ Bureau was otherwise obliged to satisfy the judgment under Directive 2009/103/EC; and whether the Directive had direct effect against the Bureau as an emanation of the State.

1. Causation. The extended meaning of “arising out of” in Dunthorne v Bentley, as summarised in UK Insurance Ltd v Holden, remained applicable. But Holden did not decide the geographical causation issue because the policy there was not limited to use on a road or other public place. Inman v Kenny and Clarke v Clarke therefore remained directly applicable. The earlier road use was merely a fortuitous concomitant of the accident and was not a contributing factor. The first basis of claim failed.

2. Reading down. Although national law must be interpreted, so far as possible, in the light of EU law, an interpretation removing the words limiting section 145(3)(a) to a road or other public place would go against the grain and thrust of the legislation. It would amount to amendment rather than interpretation, raise policy questions for which the court was not equipped, and retrospectively create criminal liability under the interlinked provisions of sections 143 and 145. The conforming interpretation was therefore unavailable.

3. Direct effect. Article 3 of Directive 2009/103/EC imposed a result to be achieved, rather than merely stating an objective or framework. In light of Vnuk v Zavarovalnica Triglav dd and subsequent CJEU decisions, its compulsory-insurance obligation extended to use of vehicles on private land. The obligation was unconditional and sufficiently precise under Becker v Finanzamt Münster-Innenstadt. Article 3 had direct effect at least to the minimum personal-injury cover of EUR 1 million per victim under Article 9. The question whether the principle of equivalence required unlimited cover was left open.

4. Emanation of the State. Farrell v Whitty (No.2) superseded the contrary reasoning in Byrne v Motor Insurers Bureau and the observations in Mighell v Reading. The conditions identified in Foster v British Gas plc were not conjunctive. A private-law compensation body entrusted with a public-interest task and possessing special powers could be an emanation of the State. There was no material distinction between the Irish MIBI and the MIB. The MIB was therefore an emanation of the State for the full measure of the Article 3 obligation.

5. The answers were: no to the first question; yes to the second and third, at least to the minimum requisite cover of EUR 1 million per victim. The court would hear counsel on the form of order and consequential matters.