Etedal Khudados v Arrow Global Accounts Management Limited

An appellate court should be slow to interfere with a first-instance case-management decision, and permission to appeal ordinarily requires a realistic prospect of showing error. That threshold is met where the judge materially misunderstood a fact relevant to the exercise of discretion. A mistaken belief that a civil Legal Aid certificate had expired, when it covered representation at the trial, was capable of undermining the decision to refuse an adjournment. Permission may therefore be granted on the grounds directly connected with that error, while being refused on unrelated grounds.

Dr Khudados sought reconsideration at an oral hearing of an earlier refusal, made on the papers, of permission to appeal an order of Mr Recorder Widdup in the County Court at Oxford dated 30 November 2017. The underlying order concerned repeated applications to adjourn a trial at which Dr Khudados was unrepresented.

The application relied on several grounds, including failure to take account of a Legal Aid certificate, alleged injustice and prejudice caused by lack of representation, lack of preparedness, and an Article 6 issue. The central question was whether the Recorder’s case-management decision disclosed an arguable error sufficient to justify permission to appeal.

1. Reconsideration and threshold. The court reconsidered its earlier paper decision refusing permission. An appellate court should be slow to interfere with a first-instance case-management decision, and an appellant must cross a high threshold. That principle does not protect a decision materially affected by a mistaken understanding of a relevant matter.
2. Legal Aid error. The Recorder had treated a Legal Aid certificate dated 30 July 2015 as expired. The documents showed that this was the certificate’s issue date, not its expiry date, and that the certificate provided substantive Legal Aid and full representation for the proceedings. The Recorder had therefore materially misconstrued the Legal Aid position.
3. Effect on discretion. The error affected the assessment of whether an adjournment should be granted. There was a material difference between uncertainty about whether Legal Aid covered the proceedings and clear evidence that it covered representation at the trial. The prospects of establishing on appeal that the adjournment decision was erroneous were consequently not fanciful.
4. Scope of permission. Permission to appeal was granted on Ground 1, concerning failure to take account of the Legal Aid certificate, and Ground 2, concerning the injustice resulting from refusal of an adjournment. Ground 2 was sufficiently closely related to Ground 1. Permission was refused on Grounds 3, 4 and 6, including the preparedness, representation-prejudice and Article 6 points, and was not granted on Ground 5.

• High Court (Chancery Division): The court reconsidered its earlier paper refusal of permission and granted permission to appeal on Grounds 1 and 2.
• County Court at Oxford: Mr Recorder Widdup made the underlying case-management order on 30 November 2017, refusing repeated applications to adjourn the trial.