Robinson v Abellio Greater Anglia Ltd (t/a 'abellio Greater Anglia')

A train operator’s duty of care is one of reasonableness, not a guarantee of passenger safety. In a highly regulated industry, applicable safety standards must receive full and proper weight, although they do not determine the legal standard conclusively. The court must assess the magnitude and likelihood of the risk, proportionality, cost, available resources and the creation of competing risks. A system is not necessarily negligent because the platform-train interface is not continuously monitored after the train safety check and before departure. The claimant must also establish that the alleged breach probably caused the injury. Where a claimant knowingly approaches a moving train and the danger could not realistically have been observed or prevented, breach and causation may both fail.

The claimant, a regular season-ticket passenger, suffered severe injuries after falling between a departing train and the platform at Bishops Stortford station. He had returned to the train while looking for a lost season ticket and moved towards it after it had begun to depart.

He alleged that the defendant train operator had failed to adopt suitable control measures, including platform-staff attendance and continuous monitoring of the platform-train interface. He also criticised the driver’s observations, the dispatch method statement and the risk assessment process. The central issues were whether the defendant was in breach of its duty of care and, if so, whether the alleged breaches caused the accident.

1. Duty and standard of care. Train staff owe passengers and others near a moving train a duty to take reasonable precautions against the inherent risks of train movement. The duty is not an absolute guarantee of safety. The court adopted the approach discussed by Hickinbottom LJ in Whiting v First/Keolis Transpennine Ltd [2018] EWCA Civ 4.
2. The driver. The driver complied with the Rule Book and the defendant’s dispatch instructions. He carried out the required checks before applying power. He was not negligent in failing to continue monitoring the CCTV after taking up power, because his attention then had to remain on the signal and line ahead, and continued monitoring could create a greater risk through distraction. The claimant’s conduct became dangerous only after the train had started moving, and there was insufficient time for braking to prevent the accident.
3. Platform staff and continuous monitoring. The defendant’s method statement and risk assessment were appropriate and complied with applicable rail-industry standards. The standards did not require a Class 379 train to be dispatched by both driver and platform staff. Cost, proportionality, the low frequency of comparable incidents and competing safety priorities were relevant. The reasoning was reinforced by Silverlink Trains Ltd v Paul Collins-Williamson [2009] EWCA Civ 850 and Whiting [2018] EWCA Civ 4, where systemic challenges based on the absence of monitoring after the safety check had been rejected.
4. Mr Perkins and causation. The platform supervisor’s role was to observe the train, not to conduct a continuous safety check of the dispatch corridor. His position, the intervening passengers and the timing of events meant that he was unlikely to have seen and responded to the claimant’s conduct. In any event, there was insufficient time for an effective warning or intervention.
5. The claim was dismissed because neither breach of duty nor causation was established. Contributory negligence therefore did not arise. If necessary, the claimant would have been found 70 per cent responsible.