Rodriguez-Purcet v Solicitors Regulation Authority

An appellate court should interfere with a refusal to adjourn only where the decision was wrong, in the sense that no properly directed tribunal could have reached it. That substantial margin of judgment does not permit a tribunal to disregard material medical evidence or the consequences of a party’s inability to instruct legal representatives. Where an adjournment is necessary to secure a fair opportunity to answer a serious allegation of dishonesty, the inconvenience, expense and delay of postponement cannot justify proceeding in the party’s absence. On a statutory appeal from a disciplinary tribunal, the court may set aside the whole decision and order a new hearing where the defective refusal to adjourn has deprived the party of a proper opportunity to defend himself.

This was a statutory appeal from the decision of the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal dated 21 March 2018, recorded in its written judgment dated 6 April 2018. The tribunal had found that the appellant, an unqualified employee working for a solicitors’ firm, had dishonestly arranged corrupt payments and had recklessly arranged the disclosure of confidential client information for cold-calling purposes. It made an order under section 43 of the Solicitors Act 1974 prohibiting his employment or remuneration in connection with a solicitor’s practice.

The appellant’s sole ground of appeal was that the tribunal had wrongly refused to adjourn the hearing despite medical evidence concerning his mental health and his solicitor’s inability to obtain substantive instructions. The issues were whether the refusal to adjourn was unlawful or wrong, and, if so, what relief should follow.

1. Appeal standard. A decision whether to adjourn is a case-management decision involving a substantial area of judgment and discretion. An appellate court should interfere only where the refusal was wrong, meaning that no tribunal properly directing itself could have done other than adjourn. A specialist tribunal is entitled to a very large measure of discretion.
2. Errors in the tribunal’s reasoning. The tribunal relied on Dr Mogg’s report without addressing that his conclusions about possible adjustments and the severity of the appellant’s condition were materially predicated on an assumption that the appellant was working. The appellant had not been working for at least a month. The tribunal also recognised at the outset that the solicitor had been unable to obtain instructions and could not represent the appellant substantively, but failed to address that problem in its operative reasoning.
3. The medical evidence from Mr O’Donnell, who had recently examined the appellant, described a worsening mental-health condition, impaired ability to participate, and the risk that the hearing could trigger a relapse. The recommendation for a full assessment required proper consideration. The tribunal should not have proceeded when the appellant was predictably neither present nor represented, particularly in a case involving a serious allegation of dishonesty.
4. Relief. Under Part 52.20 of the Civil Procedure Rules, the court had power to affirm, set aside or vary the tribunal’s decision, refer an issue for determination, or order a new hearing. The court rejected the suggestion that the outcome was effectively inevitable and that a new hearing would therefore be unnecessary. A person should have a sufficient opportunity to explain and defend himself against a finding of dishonesty, however damaging the documents might appear.
5. The whole order and judgment of the tribunal were set aside and a new hearing was ordered. The appellant’s undertakings not to work for or with a solicitors’ firm or other regulated body were accepted as interim protection for the public.

• High Court (Administrative Court): the statutory appeal from the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal was allowed. The tribunal’s order and judgment dated 21 March 2018, as recorded in its written judgment dated 6 April 2018, were set aside and the matter was ordered to be reheard.