Berkshire Assets (West London) Ltd, R (on the application of) v London Borough of Hounslow (rev 1)

The interpretation of an Article 4 direction is an objective exercise. The court asks what a reasonable reader, equipped with appropriate knowledge of planning law and practice, would understand from the words used, read in their context and in light of the document’s purpose. Natural and ordinary meaning remains the starting point. A direction withdrawing permitted development rights therefore protects extant prior approvals where its wording expressly excludes buildings or land in relation to which prior approval has been granted. The court cannot rewrite that wording to reflect the authority’s broader intention. A 56-day deemed permission under the prior approval procedure does not arise where the authority has issued a refusal within that period.

The claimant, the freehold owner of office premises in Brentford, challenged the London Borough of Hounslow’s refusal of three applications for prior approval under Part 3 Class O of the Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) Order 2015. The applications concerned conversion of the premises from offices to residential use.

Hounslow had confirmed an Article 4 direction withdrawing Class O permitted development rights. The direction excluded buildings or land in relation to which prior approval had been granted before confirmation. The central issue was whether that exclusion protected the property’s extant prior approvals and permitted further applications, or protected only specific development already covered by those approvals.

1. Interpretation of the direction. The court applied the objective reasonable-reader approach applicable to public planning documents. The reader was taken to have appropriate knowledge of planning law and practice. The natural and ordinary meaning of the words was the starting point, while the wider context and purpose remained relevant. Extrinsic material had limited significance, particularly because the document was public and could affect third parties.
2. The wording of the Hounslow Article 4 direction excluded from its operation any building or land in relation to which prior approval had been granted before the direction was confirmed. That wording protected sites with extant prior approvals. Hounslow’s narrower construction would require the court to substitute the word development for the words building or land. The court could not do so merely because the Council had intended a more restrictive outcome.
3. The wording differed materially from article 4(2) of the Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) Order 2015, which expressly preserves the carrying out of development where the prior approval date preceded the direction’s commencement and completion occurs within three years. The surrounding context, including the Secretary of State’s modification of other directions, supported the broader protection for developers with prior approval before the direction took effect.
4. The court declined to decide whether the exclusion extended to lapsed prior approvals. The wording was ambiguous on that issue, and the context and purpose might not produce the same result as for extant approvals.
5. The claimant’s argument based on the 56-day prior approval period failed. Paragraph W did not permit development to begin where the Council had issued refusal notices within the 56-day period. The appropriate course was for the claimant to pursue its appeals against those notices.
6. The Council’s three refusal decisions dated 12 and 13 March 2018 were quashed. The declarations sought by the claimant were refused.

The judgment was a first-instance judicial review. The judgment records that a planning inspector had previously allowed two appeals concerning prior approval for the same property. The claimant had also appealed the refusal notices, and the court considered that appeal process the appropriate route after quashing the decisions.