Griffths v Crown Prosecution Service

An inability to cross-examine a complainant does not automatically make a criminal trial unfair. The court must assess whether a fair trial remained possible and whether the evidence could properly be given appropriate weight. Relevant considerations include the complainant’s earlier confirmed account, any later retraction or uncertainty, the defendant’s own account, other evidence, and the tribunal’s assessment of reliability.

A submission of no case to answer succeeds only where no reasonable tribunal, properly directed, could convict on the prosecution evidence. Conflicting or equivocal evidence ordinarily concerns reliability and weight, matters for the tribunal of fact.

The appellant was convicted by Gwent Magistrates of assault by beating following an alleged domestic incident. The principal prosecution witness initially made statements implicating him, later sought to retract them, and at trial refused to answer questions after confirming that the statements were true when made.

The statements were admitted under section 119 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. The appellant challenged the magistrates’ refusal to stay the proceedings for abuse of process, refusal of a half-time submission of no case to answer, and conviction. The central issues were whether a fair trial remained possible and whether the evidence was capable of supporting conviction.

1. The three questions stated for the opinion of the High Court were answered in the negative. The magistrates had not erred in refusing a stay, rejecting the half-time submission, or convicting the appellant.
2. Whether a fair trial was possible depended on an evaluation of all relevant material. The inability to cross-examine the complainant was a significant disadvantage, but it did not inevitably require a stay. The magistrates were entitled to consider the complainant’s repeated confirmation of her first statement, the reasons for her retraction, her equivocal remark that both parties had done wrong, the appellant’s account of self-defence, and the surrounding evidence.
3. The statements were capable of being admitted as evidence of the truth of their contents under section 119 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. The complainant’s refusal to answer questions affected the assessment of weight and credibility, but did not make reliance on the statements legally impermissible.
4. Under the second limb of the R v Galbraith test, the question was whether a reasonable tribunal, properly directed in accordance with law, could convict on the prosecution case: [1981] 73 Cr App R 124. The magistrates were entitled to conclude that the complainant’s original account was capable of belief. Her statement that both had done wrong fell well short of showing that she was the aggressor.
5. Assessment of conflicting accounts and witness reliability was principally for the tribunal of fact, which had seen and heard the witness. The magistrates had considered the relevant matters and their conclusion could not be characterised as perverse.

• High Court (Administrative Court): On an appeal by way of case stated from Gwent Magistrates, the court answered all three questions in the negative and upheld the conviction.