Fitzwilliam Land Company & Ors v Cheesman & Ors

Where an injunction may restrain freedom of expression or assembly, the claimant must show that it is more likely than not that relief will be granted at trial. In a trespass claim, a landowner with an undisputed title is prima facie entitled to protect the land, and a substantial, real and imminent risk of further trespass may justify quia timet relief. Protesters cannot generally justify trespass by asserting that they are exposing allegedly unlawful conduct; any necessity defence is exceptionally narrow. The court must balance property rights against Convention rights, including Articles 10 and 11 and Article 1 of the First Protocol. An interim injunction should be limited in scope and duration where possible. Relief against persons unknown may be granted, but an injunction protecting animals or goods on third-party land requires particular caution.

The claimants, landowners and operators of the Fitzwilliam (Milton) Hunt, sought interim injunctions against identified protesters and persons unknown. They alleged repeated trespass on their land and sought additional protection for animals and chattels used on third-party land. The defendants disputed trespass, relied on freedom of expression and assembly, and argued that the Hunt’s activities might contravene the Hunting Act 2004.

The court considered whether the claimants were more likely than not to obtain final relief, whether there was a real and imminent risk of further trespass, the adequacy of damages, and the balance of convenience.

1. The court applied the heightened threshold accepted for interim relief engaging Articles 10 and 11: it had to be more likely than not that the claimants would obtain an injunction at trial.
2. The evidence established, on that standard, a real and imminent risk of further trespass by D1, D2, D4, D6, D7, D11, D14 and persons unknown. The photographic and video evidence was assessed collectively. Evidence of trespass on third-party land was not, by itself, sufficient to establish the necessary risk on the claimants’ land.
3. A landowner whose title is not disputed is prima facie entitled to restrain trespass, whether or not the trespass causes substantial harm. Damages were inadequate because the claimants sought to protect their property rights rather than obtain a monetary substitute.
4. The alleged illegality of the Hunt’s activities was relevant to the balance of convenience but did not provide a defence to trespass. The court regarded the arguments concerning the Hunting Act 2004 as persuasive but unresolved. The necessity defence was unlikely to succeed absent very exceptional circumstances.
5. The balance of convenience favoured a limited injunction. Property rights weighed heavily, while the injunction also reduced risks of public disorder, injury and damage. The relief was limited to trespass to the claimants’ land, with plans identifying the land and public rights of way, and was to continue until trial or further order. The applications concerning trespass to animals and chattels were refused because the evidence and practical scope of that relief were insufficient.
6. The court declined to determine whether a named defendant against whom no specific injunction was made could be treated as a person unknown. That issue was left for any later enforcement or extension application.