A Local Authority v M and F & Ors (care orders and wardship)

In care and adoption proceedings, the court must assess each child’s welfare individually, applying the balance of probabilities and evaluating the evidence holistically. Adoption is a last resort and requires a finding that it is necessary and better for the child than any alternative. The existence of a long-term foster placement does not prevent consideration of adoption, but the likely harm caused by an adoptive search and the realistic prospects of finding a suitable placement are relevant welfare factors. Passport retention requires a close evaluation of risk, necessity and proportionality. Reassurance or speculative risk is insufficient to justify a prolonged interference with parental rights.

A local authority sought care orders for six children, placement orders for two younger children, continuation of wardship for a seventh child in Pakistan, forced marriage protection orders and retention of the parents’ passports. The parents accepted that the threshold for care orders was met, but sought rehabilitation of some or all children to the mother. The Children’s Guardian supported care orders and opposed placement orders for the two younger children, whose foster carers offered long-term care.

The central issues were whether the parents could provide safe and adequate care; the appropriate level of parental and sibling contact; whether adoption should be pursued for the two younger children; the continuation of wardship; and whether the parents’ passports should be retained.

1. The court found the threshold under Children Act 1989, section 31, satisfied in respect of all six children. The parents’ physical abuse, emotional abuse, dishonesty, concealment of abuse, attempts to influence the children and removal of children to Pakistan meant that neither parent could provide good enough and safe enough care. Care orders were therefore necessary and proportionate.

2. Fact-finding had to be based on evidence and proper inferences, not suspicion or speculation. The evidence had to be evaluated holistically, with each item considered in the context of the whole evidential picture. Lies could have different motives and were not by themselves proof of guilt, although deliberate lies on a material issue, motivated by consciousness of guilt, could amount to corroboration.

3. Parental contact had to be assessed from the children’s perspective. Regularity and quality were more important than quantum. In view of the parents’ attempts to destabilise placements and influence evidence, contact was limited to three times per year, with a warning that further attempts to undermine placements could lead to reconsideration.

4. Applying Adoption and Children Act 2002, section 1, adoption remained a last resort. The court had to consider the full range of options and could not make a placement order unless it was better for the child than not making one. The realistic size of the pool of suitable adopters, the likely emotional harm of preparatory work, the risk of disrupting a successful placement and the children’s sibling and family relationships were relevant considerations.

5. The risks of searching for an adoptive placement for E and F outweighed the advantages of adoption. Their placement orders were refused. Care orders were made, with the children remaining together in their current long-term foster placement.

6. G remained a ward of court. The court declined to retain the parents’ passports. Although the court had power to make such an order, retention would have required a close evaluation of risk, necessity and proportionality. The children’s care orders and forced marriage protection orders provided protection, and retaining the passports for many years would be disproportionate.

First-instance judgment. The judgment itself refers to the Court of Appeal decision in M (Children), [2017] EWCA Civ, concerning passport retention.