Terzic v County State Attorney's Office In Zagreb, Croatia

Under section 14 of the Extradition Act 2003, passage of time bars extradition only where it makes extradition unjust or oppressive. The question focuses on the effect of delay, including whether a fair trial remains possible and whether changed circumstances create more than ordinary hardship. Delay is not, by itself, sufficient, and responsibility for the delay is not generally decisive.

Article 8 requires a separate proportionality assessment. The availability of less coercive measures may be relevant, but a court may uphold extradition where the requested person can receive a fair trial and the interference with private and family life is proportionate.

The appellant appealed under section 26 of the Extradition Act 2003 against a District Judge’s order for his extradition to Croatia to face prosecution for alleged dishonesty and laundering-related conduct concerning a Croatian company.

Permission was granted on two grounds: whether extradition was unjust or oppressive by reason of the passage of time under section 14, and whether it disproportionately interfered with the appellant’s and his family’s Article 8 rights. The appellant relied on delay, the effect on his family, and proposed interview or voluntary surrender arrangements.

1. Appeal dismissed. The District Judge had been entitled to conclude that extradition would not be unjust or oppressive under section 14 of the Extradition Act 2003.
2. The concepts of injustice and oppression overlap. Injustice is directed principally to prejudice in the conduct of the trial. Oppression concerns hardship arising from changes in the requested person’s circumstances. The central question is the effect of the passage of time, rather than responsibility for the delay. Oppression requires more than ordinary hardship, and the burden rests on the requested person to show that a fair trial is no longer possible or that extradition would otherwise be oppressive. The principles in Kakis v Government of the Republic of Cyprus [1978] 1 WLR 779, Gomes v Government of Trinidad and Tobago [2009] 1 WLR 103 and Nowak v District Court in Koszalin, Poland [2014] EWHC 118 (Admin) were applied.
3. The appellant retained a good recollection of relevant events. Witnesses were available and willing to give evidence, and no defence witness was identified as unavailable. There was no evidence that Croatia would fail to comply with its Convention obligations. The judge was also entitled to find no culpable delay. Knowledge which passport officials may have acquired about the appellant’s whereabouts could not be imputed to the respondent: Spanovic v Croatia [2009] EWHC 723 (Admin).
4. The Article 8 assessment was separate from the section 14 inquiry. The judge had considered the appellant’s family circumstances, the substantial delay, his offer to be interviewed, and the possibility of less coercive measures. The conclusion that extradition was not disproportionate was open to him. The approach concerning less coercive measures was consistent with Volle v Germany [2015] EWHC 1484 (Admin).
5. Whether the appellant would obtain bail in Croatia was distinct from whether he would receive a fair trial. Both grounds of appeal therefore failed.

1. High Court (Administrative Court) — The appeal against the District Judge’s extradition order dated 14 August 2018 was dismissed.