Lacey v Leonard

A judge must identify the issues critical to the decision and explain how they were resolved. A general conclusion is insufficient where it does not address the principal arguments advanced.

For pre-action disclosure, the threshold in CPR 31.16(3)(d) must first be satisfied. Each application turns on its own facts. Disclosure of medical records may in principle save costs before final settlement, but the evidence must show that it is likely to assist resolution, fair disposal or cost saving. Raw medical records will not generally provide the same basis for settlement as expert medical evidence.

The claimant suffered personal injury in a road traffic accident. Liability was admitted, but the proposed defendant sought pre-action disclosure of medical records, earnings information and employment documents under CPR 31.16.

Master Gidden dismissed the application, holding that the disclosure sought was unlikely to dispose fairly of the anticipated proceedings, assist settlement without proceedings or save costs. He granted permission to appeal on the ground that he had failed to give adequate reasons.

The appeal concerned whether the Master’s reasons were sufficient and, if not, whether the High Court should determine the pre-action disclosure application itself.

1. The appeal was allowed. The Master’s judgment did not satisfy the requirement that the parties and an appellate court should be able to understand why the decision was reached. It did not address the principal submissions that disclosure might facilitate an interim payment, rehabilitation, settlement and cost saving. A general observation that settlement was unlikely without expert medical evidence did not explain why those arguments were rejected.
2. The requirement to give reasons does not require every submission or evidential factor to be recorded. It does require the judge to identify and explain the issues vital to the conclusion, applying English v Emery Reimbold & Strick Ltd [2002] 1 WLR 2409.
3. The court then exercised its powers under CPR 52.20(1) to determine the application. The threshold question was whether the disclosure was desirable for one of the objectives in CPR 31.16(3)(d). Only if that threshold was met would the discretionary question arise.
4. Each application for pre-action disclosure depends on its own facts. Disclosure of medical records relating to the accident could, in principle, assist the objective of saving costs under CPR 31.16(3)(d)(iii). However, the evidence did not show that disclosure would probably resolve the dispute or save costs. The parties had made clear that expert medical reports, rather than raw medical data, were likely to provide the basis for settlement. The proposed connection between disclosure, an interim payment, rehabilitation and reduced loss was too remote.
5. The information sought about wages, tax returns and job offers also failed to satisfy CPR 31.16(3)(d), particularly since the evidence explained that the claimant had not been working, held no relevant tax returns and had no job offers or acceptances. The application for pre-action disclosure was therefore dismissed.

• High Court (Queen’s Bench Division): appeal from Master Gidden’s decision dated 2 May 2018. The appeal was allowed, but the application for pre-action disclosure was determined afresh and dismissed.