Reynolds & Anor v Long

A contempt finding requires proof beyond reasonable doubt that the order was breached. Contempt is generally a strict liability offence: the contemnor need intend the prohibited act or omission, without intending to disobey the order.

Where an order permits substituted service and is served in accordance with its terms, the respondent is fixed with knowledge of the order. Mental illness may mitigate sentence, but does not remove liability where the respondent had capacity to comply. Impossibility is a defence only where compliance was genuinely impossible and the respondent had no choice whether to perform the required act.

Committal serves both punitive and coercive purposes. Imprisonment is a sentence of last resort, but may be appropriate for serious and deliberate non-compliance causing substantial prejudice.

The claimants in three related proceedings applied to commit Steven Long for 29 alleged breaches of disclosure, asset-information and injunction orders made in March and July 2018. The orders concerned trust funds, assets, bank accounts and documents relating to the claimants’ investments and dealings with Mr Long and associated businesses.

Mr Long accepted some breaches. He contended that he had not known of the July orders until personal service of the committal application in November 2018, that his mental state prevented compliance, and that police seizure of business records made compliance impossible. The central issues were whether substituted service fixed him with knowledge, whether impossibility or mental illness excused the breaches, and what sentence was appropriate.

1. Contempt established. All 29 breaches were proved beyond reasonable doubt. Contempt is generally a strict liability offence. It is sufficient that the respondent intended the relevant conduct or omission; an intention to disobey is unnecessary (para [31]).
2. Knowledge through substituted service. The July orders expressly dispensed with personal service under CPR r 81.8 and specified service by post and email. Once served in accordance with those provisions, Mr Long was fixed with knowledge of the orders on 19 and 20 July 2018. His failure to read them did not prevent contempt, although his mental state was relevant to mitigation (paras [44]-[47]). P v P was distinguished as addressing a different issue, namely the contemnor’s capacity to understand the order, rather than the effect of valid substituted service.
3. Impossibility. The seizure of records by the police did not make compliance impossible. Mr Long had made only minimal efforts to obtain access, and could have sought relevant information from the police, banks and professional contacts. The principle that failure to perform an impossible undertaking is not contempt did not assist him on the facts (paras [48]-[54]).
4. Sentence. The court considered culpability, duration, prejudice, the extent of non-disclosure, any misleading conduct, admissions, remorse, belated compliance, character and antecedents. Committal may punish past contempt and secure compliance. Imprisonment remains a last resort, but the breaches were serious, deliberate and caused significant prejudice. Mental-health evidence was taken into account, although it did not excuse the breaches.
5. Order. An immediate custodial sentence of eight months was imposed for each of the 29 contempts, with the sentences to run concurrently. The court regarded eight months as the minimum appropriate sentence.