G (Notice to Parents: Duty of Local Authority under s22(4) CA 1989)

A local authority’s duty under section 22(4) of the Children Act 1989 is qualified by the words “so far as is reasonably practicable”. A professional judgment may take account of a Gillick-competent child’s consistent wishes that confidential therapeutic information should not be shared with a parent, and evidence that disclosure would cause psychological harm. A child subject to a care order should not lose confidentiality solely because of that order. The assessment is different where proposed treatment is medical intervention, which may require a higher threshold. The court may dispense with service where exceptional circumstances and strong countervailing factors justify doing so.

The local authority sought declarations concerning whether it had to inform G’s mother of G’s referral to the Tavistock Gender Identity Clinic and possible therapeutic assistance. G was in the authority’s care following care proceedings in which serious harm by her mother had been found. G consistently opposed disclosure, had been assessed as Gillick competent, and was considered likely to suffer psychological harm if her mother were informed.

The mother was not given notice of the application. G’s father supported the application after being informed. The central issues were whether notice should be given, whether service should be dispensed with, and whether the court should declare that section 22(4) did not require consultation with the mother.

1. Service. The interim orders preventing service of, or notice of, the proceedings on the mother were continued under rule 6.36 of the Family Procedure Rules 2010. Exceptional circumstances and strong countervailing factors justified that course. G was Gillick competent, had consistently opposed disclosure, and the evidence established a real risk of psychological harm if the mother were informed.
2. Section 22(4). The phrase “so far as is reasonably practicable” permits a local authority to exercise professional judgment about whether consultation with a parent is reasonably practicable. Applying TW v London Borough of Enfield and Secretary of State for Health, [2013] EWHC 1180 (QB), that judgment may take account of the child’s wishes, Gillick competence, and evidence that overriding those wishes would cause harm.
3. That approach applied to confidential therapeutic treatment concerning G’s gender identity. The local authority had already acted without consulting the parents in relation to the referral, and it was irrational to impose a consultation duty concerning therapeutic assistance which G, as a competent child, opposed and which disclosure might positively harm.
4. The position could be different for medical intervention. Whether consultation was reasonably practicable in that context would depend on the facts at the time and would involve a higher threshold.
5. The court declined to make the broad declarations sought. A child’s entitlement to confidentiality should not be reduced merely because the child is subject to a care order. The existing statutory framework enabled the local authority to make the relevant professional judgment.