George Galloway v Aisha Ali-Khan

Sentencing for contempt must reflect both the seriousness of the breach and the purpose of securing compliance with court orders or undertakings. Deliberate, flagrant, persistent and inexcusable breaches may cross the custody threshold even where the harm caused is limited. Relevant aggravating factors include repeated breaches, evasive conduct and previous contempts. The court may take account of a suspended sentence imposed in separate criminal proceedings as an aggravating feature, without automatically activating it where the criminal statutory regime does not apply. Activation of a suspended sentence for contempt involves judicial discretion, having regard to the past and current circumstances and the gravity of the breach. The court must also apply totality and account for the punitive effect of a costs order.

The defendant had previously worked for the claimant and had given undertakings not to publish statements referring to him or defaming or disparaging him. She admitted 26 breaches committed between October 2017 and January 2018. The breaches occurred during the operational period of a two-month suspended sentence imposed by Leeds Crown Court for an earlier contempt.

The court had to determine the appropriate sentence for the admitted contempts, including whether the custody threshold was crossed, whether the earlier suspended sentence should be activated, and what effect should be given to the defendant’s mitigation, admissions and liability for costs.

1. Sentence. The contempts crossed the custody threshold. Although the harm to the claimant was not particularly serious, the breaches were deliberate, flagrant, persistent and inexcusable. The defendant understood both the undertakings and the consequences of breach. The court’s ability to rely on litigants’ promises is fundamental to the civil litigation process.
2. Aggravating and mitigating factors. The large number and duration of the breaches, their timing, the defendant’s evasive response when challenged, and her previous record aggravated the offending. Her mental health, family responsibilities, removal of the offending material, apology, undertaking not to breach further orders and late admissions were taken into account in mitigation.
3. Suspended sentence. The statutory rule governing activation of a suspended sentence following a further criminal offence did not apply. Applying the principles stated in Villiers v Villiers [1994] 1 WLR 493, activation was discretionary rather than automatic. The court had power to activate the earlier sentence, but treated the commission of the present contempts during its operational period as a significant aggravating factor and did not activate it.
4. Overall sentence and costs. The starting sentence for a contested hearing would have been 18 weeks. A 15 per cent reduction was allowed for the defendant’s late admissions. A further reduction was made to reflect the punitive aspect of the costs order and the principle of totality. The defendant was sentenced to 12 weeks’ immediate imprisonment and ordered to pay the claimant’s costs on the standard basis. The earlier suspended sentence remained in force.

First-instance sentencing decision. No appellate history was stated in the judgment.