Churchil Ltd v The Open College Network South Eastern Region Ltd (t/a Laser Learning Awards)

A party must generally bring forward in one action all claims arising from substantially the same facts. The question is whether, considering all the circumstances and adopting a broad merits-based approach, later proceedings amount to an abuse of the court’s process. The mere fact that a claim could have been raised earlier does not automatically establish abuse, but a second action may be oppressive where it requires the defendant and the court to revisit substantially the same dispute.

A limitation defence does not ordinarily justify strike-out under CPR Part 3.4(2)(a) or (b). Limitation is a defence, and determination of any application to disapply the limitation period may require evidence and an assessment of all the circumstances.

The claimant had contracted with the defendant to provide regulated security-industry training and qualifications. The defendant terminated the agreement and notified regulators and other awarding bodies. The claimant issued County Court proceedings alleging breach of contract and seeking damages and injunctive relief.

Judgment was entered for the claimant for £4,480. The County Court later held that damages had been determined, that no further injunction was available, and that the pleadings contained no recognisable defamation claim. The claimant’s renewed application for permission to appeal that decision was heard with the defendant’s application to strike out a subsequent High Court defamation claim and an application to amend.

The central issues were whether the later defamation and interference claims were abusive because they could and should have been brought in the first action, and whether the defamation claim was time-barred.

1. Permission to appeal: Permission to appeal the County Court decision was refused. The damages issue had been determined by the judgment entered on 16 February 2016. The claimant was not entitled to further injunctive relief, and the County Court pleadings contained no recognisable defamation claim.
2. Abuse of process: Applying the principles in Henderson v Henderson (3 Hare 100), as explained in Johnson v Gore-Wood & Co [2002] 2 AC 1, the court adopted a broad merits-based assessment of all the circumstances. The claimant knew the facts on which the later defamation claim was based, had the necessary information to bring it with the contractual claim, and had already relied on the same notifications in the County Court. Requiring the defendant to defend a second action on substantially the same facts would be oppressive and abusive.
3. The High Court claim was therefore struck out under the Henderson principle. The proposed amendment, advancing tortious interference and further damages on the same factual basis, was refused for the same reason.
4. Limitation: The court explained that the one-year limitation period for defamation under section 4A of the Limitation Act 1980 had expired. However, limitation is a defence rather than a failure to disclose reasonable grounds or an abuse of process. Strike-out under CPR Part 3.4(2)(a) or (b) was therefore procedurally inappropriate. The claimant’s reliance on section 32A required consideration of evidence and could not be determined summarily on the material before the court.
5. The claim was struck out for abuse of process, the amendment application was refused, and the limitation ground was not upheld.

• County Court: HHJ Wulwik held on 23 October 2017 that the damages had been determined, that no further injunctive relief was available, and that the County Court pleadings contained no recognisable defamation claim.
• High Court: Nicklin J refused permission to appeal and, on the defendant’s application, struck out the subsequent High Court claim as an abuse of process.