Crown House Technologies Ltd v Cardiff Commissioning Ltd & Anor

Summary judgment requires the claimant to show a real prospect of success. The case must be better than merely arguable, but the court must avoid conducting a mini-trial. The relevant question is whether the claim has reality.

A claimant cannot advance an alternative case that is factually inconsistent with its pleaded case and unsupported by evidence, in the hope that cross-examination or disclosure will provide a foundation. Where late evidence is served, relief from sanctions requires consideration of whether the breach is serious and significant, whether there is a good reason, and whether relief is just and reasonable.

The claimant brought proceedings concerning damage to air-conditioning units supplied by the second defendant and installed by the claimant. The principal allegations were that the user manual was unclear, that the equipment should have been marked to identify discharge valves, and that the second defendant failed to respond adequately after leaks appeared.

The second defendant applied for summary judgment under Part 24. The claimant resisted the application and sought to rely on late evidence, requiring an application for relief from sanctions. The central issues were whether the claim had a real prospect of success and whether the late evidence should be admitted.

1. Summary judgment. The claimant had to demonstrate a real prospect of success, meaning a case better than merely arguable. The hearing was not a summary trial and should not become a mini-trial. The governing criterion was the absence of reality, applying ED&F Man Liquid Products Limited v Patel [2003] EWCA Civ. 472, Swain v Hilman [2001] 1 All ER 91 and Three Rivers DC v Bank of England No. 3 [2001] 2 All ER 513.
2. Alternative and inconsistent cases. A claimant cannot run a factually inconsistent case. The alternative allegation that the manual was potentially misleading was inconsistent with the claimant’s pleaded case that the manual was clear, lacked evidential support, and depended on speculation about what might emerge from cross-examination. It therefore had no realistic prospect of success. The principle in Clarke v Marlborough Fine Art (London) and another [2002] 1 WLR 1731 was applied.
3. Other allegations. The marking allegation added nothing where the manual was clear and was unsupported by evidence. The allegation concerning the response to the leaks was also fanciful: the supplier had repeatedly advised that the units be drained, and the claimant could not identify any additional loss caused after the leaks were discovered.
4. Late evidence. Applying the three-stage approach in Denton v T H White [2014] EWCA Civ. 906, the delay was significant and had no good reason. Nevertheless, it was just and reasonable to permit reliance on the evidence because the defendant had already considered and responded to it.
5. Disposition. Judgment was entered under Civil Procedure Rules 1998 Part 24 for the second defendant. A conditional order was unnecessary.