AXB v BXA

Deceit may be established in an intimate relationship where a party deliberately makes false representations intending the other to act on them. The defendant need not have acted for personal financial gain if the claimant suffered loss through reliance. There is no general public-policy bar to a deceit claim arising from an intimate relationship.

For harassment, the court must assess the whole course of conduct, excluding communications that may reasonably be regarded as legitimate discussions, while considering whether the remaining conduct is unreasonable. Injunctive relief requires a significant continuing risk of harassment or privacy infringement. Sexual information ordinarily engages Article 8, but protection remains subject to the ultimate balancing exercise against Article 10 and any genuine public interest.

The claimant sought damages and injunctions arising from an intimate relationship with the defendant. He alleged that she had obtained money by false claims about pregnancy and homelessness, had harassed him and his family, and had disclosed private correspondence, medical material and other personal information.

The defendant did not attend the trial, did not give evidence and had failed to comply with procedural requirements. The court therefore determined the claims on the evidence available, while recognising that some issues remained uncertain because her account had not been tested.

The central issues were whether the alleged representations constituted deceit, whether the defendant’s conduct amounted to harassment, whether private-information rights had been infringed, and whether damages and injunctions were appropriate.

1. Deceit. The defendant had deliberately made false representations concerning pregnancies and the claimant’s responsibility for her homelessness. The claimant relied on those representations and paid substantial sums. Those payments were recoverable. It was unnecessary to prove that the defendant’s motive was personal financial gain, provided that she intended the claimant to act on the false representation and loss resulted: (1889) 14 App Cas 337; [2000] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 218.
2. There was no public-policy reason preventing a deceit claim arising from an intimate personal relationship. The court followed the modern first-instance approach allowing such claims where deception was used to obtain money or property: [2001] 1 FLR 1041; [2007] 2 FLR 1051. The payments made towards the Christie’s course were not sufficiently connected with the false representations and were not recoverable.
3. Harassment. Whether conduct was harassment depended on the circumstances. Legitimate communications by a pregnant woman seeking to discuss paternity, decisions and financial arrangements could not automatically be characterised as harassment. The court considered the whole course of conduct, excluding legitimate communications and most purely personal contacts, but included threats, involvement of third parties, false claims and disclosures of private material. The remaining conduct amounted to harassment under the Prevention of Harassment Act 1997.
4. Privacy and injunctions. Sexual activity and related information engaged a reasonable expectation of privacy, including where adultery was involved: [2016] AC 1081. The court carried out the ultimate balancing exercise between Article 8 and Article 10 rights. There was no genuine public interest in publishing the intensely personal material, and the defendant represented a continuing risk of further harassment and disclosure. An injunction was therefore justified, applying the significant-risk approach in [2002] EWHC 3151 (QB). The claimant recovered £5,000 for privacy infringements, with no separate award for harassment to avoid double counting.
5. The abuse-of-process allegation failed. The defendant had not established the formidable threshold required to show that the claimant had forfeited the right to have his case determined: [2012] 1 WLR 2004.