Mazana, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

Immigration detention remains lawful where, viewed at the relevant time and without hindsight, there is a realistic prospect of removal within a reasonable period. The authorities need not identify a precise removal date. The court must weigh the length of detention, obstacles to removal, the Secretary of State’s diligence, detention conditions, the individual’s circumstances, and the risks of absconding and harm. As detention lengthens, removal must become more proximate. A public law error in failing to follow accommodation-funding guidance does not itself establish unlawful detention where the error caused no additional period of detention that was otherwise unlawful.

The claimant, a South African national subject to a deportation order, was detained under immigration powers from 21 January 2017 until his release on bail on 29 January 2018. His removal was delayed because South African authorities paused the issue of emergency travel documents for foreign national offenders pending a data-sharing agreement.

He accepted that detention until mid-July 2017 was lawful. He challenged the later period on two grounds: that removal was not realistically achievable within a reasonable time, contrary to the third Hardial Singh principle; and that the Secretary of State had failed to follow guidance requiring funding of approved accommodation for an offender unable to pay. The court also considered whether the latter error caused any unlawful prolongation of detention.

1. Third Hardial Singh principle. The Secretary of State had to justify both the need for and duration of detention. The court acted as the primary decision-maker and assessed the information known at the time, without hindsight. The relevant question was whether there was a realistic prospect of removal within a period reasonable in all the circumstances.
2. There is no definitive reasonable period and no requirement for a precise removal date. Relevant considerations included the length of detention, the obstacles to removal, the diligence and expedition of the Secretary of State, the conditions and effects of detention, the risk of absconding, and the risk of harm if the claimant absconded. The longer detention continued, the more proximate removal needed to be.
3. The cancellation of removal directions did not automatically make detention unlawful. The negotiations concerning emergency travel documents were progressing, were being monitored, and never appeared incapable of resolution. The absence of a fixed timescale for final approval of the data-sharing agreement did not destroy the realistic prospect of removal. The claimant’s serious offending, high assessed risks, history of breaching court orders, absence of health concerns, and the regularity of detention reviews supported continued detention.
4. The Secretary of State had been confused about the accommodation-funding guidance. By 24 October 2017 it was clear that the claimant could not fund approved accommodation, and funding should have been conceded within a short reasonable period. That error did not alter the outcome. Approved accommodation could take up to eight weeks to arrange, while progress towards removal continued and, by late November, removal was again expected within about four weeks. The claimant would therefore have remained lawfully detained even without the delay in agreeing funding.
5. The claim for damages for unlawful detention was dismissed.

First-instance judicial review claim. The judgment records no prior merits decision requiring appellate review.